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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
As a result of the horrific tragedies of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, 
considerable resources have been devoted by Federal, state, and local agencies to 
improve the nation’s capacity to respond to terrorist acts and naturally occurring 
epidemics/disasters.  The focus has been on improving the capabilities of traditional “first 
responders”, such as fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical service (EMS) 
personnel.  Additionally, the focus of the majority of communication, information, and 
resource supply improvements has been on those organizations and personnel “in the 
field”.  Only recently have hospitals been recognized as first responders or “first 
receivers”, and included in these initiatives. (OSHA, 2005) 
 Recent mass casualty events, such as 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina, have illustrated 
that the demand for health care can overwhelm the ability of hospitals to respond.  Acute 
care hospitals are essential to the infrastructure of modern communities. Hospitals can 
be damaged by a disaster and still have to protect and support in-house patient 
populations as well as treat large influxes of new patients.  During emergency events, it 
is critical that state and local emergency management agencies (EMAs) have effective 
communication with and information about area hospitals. 
 Communication, information, and resource management (CIR) linkages are the 
who, what, why, and how of emergency response:  what information is crucial, how can 
it be transferred quickly and accurately, who needs it, and how does one make sense of 
overwhelming volumes of it during a crisis?  This concept and the interrelated value of 
information management systems was eloquently explained in the U.S. House of 
Representatives special 2006 report entitled, A Failure of Initiative: 
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 “The preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina show we are still an 
analog government in a digital age.  We must recognize that we are woefully 
incapable of storing, moving, and accessing information – especially in times of 
crisis. 
 
 Many of the problems we have identified can be categorized as ‘information 
gaps’ – or at least problems with information-related implications, or failures to 
act decisively because information was sketchy at best.   Better information 
would have been the optimal weapon against Katrina.  Information sent to the 
right people at the right place at the right time.  Information moved within 
agencies, across departments, and between jurisdictions of government as well.  
Seamlessly. Securely. Efficiently.   
 
 The Federal government is the largest purchaser of information technology in the 
world, by far.  One would think we could share information by now.  But Katrina 
again proved we cannot.” (GPO, 2006) 
 
  
 The purpose of the research presented in this dissertation was three-fold: (1) to 
determine the current state, post 9/11/01, of communication, information, and resource 
(CIR) management linkages during mass casualty events among emergency 
management agencies (EMAs) and area hospitals in large US cities; (2) to identify and 
investigate a real-world model of strong CIR linkages; and (3) to determine how 
weaknesses in current CIR linkages could be strengthened, including the role of 
information technology in supporting these improvements. 
 The following three chapters are arranged into three separate manuscripts, 
formatted for refereed journal publication consideration.  Chapter II reviews historical 
CIR linkages among EMAs and hospitals and describes lessons learned that can be 
used by any response agency to improve CIR linkages.  This served as the foundation 
for the development and conduct of a survey, presented in Chapter III, to determine the 
state of the practice, post 9/11, of CIR linkages among hospitals and EMAs in several 
large cities across the country.  Of particular interest was whether the post-9/11 influx of 
resources and attention to emergency preparedness had yielded any improvements in 
CIR linkages.  Chapter IV presents a detailed investigation of relationship and linkage-
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building efforts in Phoenix, Arizona which emerged as a best practice from the research 
study.  Finally, Chapter V concludes by summarizing key research findings and 
recommendations, and discussing directions for future study. 
 Because Chapters II, III, and IV are intended to be independent, yet interrelated, 
certain information is repeated.  Efforts were made to keep this redundancy to a 
minimum, overlapping only when necessary for clarity. 
 
Reference 
 
General Printing Office (GPO), (2006). “A Failure of Initiative – Final Report of the Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina”, U.S. House of Representatives, February 15. 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html [accessed March 2, 2006]. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
A SYNTHESIS OF THE LEVEL OF COORDINATION AMONG HOSPITALS AND 
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As a result of the horrific tragedies of September 11, 2001 and Hurricane Katrina, 
considerable resources have been devoted by Federal, state, and local agencies to 
improve the nation’s capacity to respond to terrorist acts and naturally occurring 
epidemics/disasters.  Emphasis has been on improving the capabilities of traditional “first 
responders”, such as fire, law enforcement, and emergency medical service (EMS) 
personnel.  Additionally, the focus of the majority of communication, information, and 
resource supply improvements has been on those organizations and personnel “in the 
field”.  Only recently have hospitals been recognized as first responders or “first 
receivers”, and included in these initiatives. (OSHA, 2005) 
 Actual mass casualty events, such as 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina, and disaster 
drills, such as the Top Officials (TOPOFF) exercises, have illustrated that the demand 
for health care can overwhelm the ability of hospitals to respond.  Acute care hospitals 
are essential to the infrastructure of modern communities. Hospitals can also be 
damaged by a disaster, and still have to protect and support in-house patient 
populations as well as treat large influxes of new patients, as depicted in Figure 2.1. (Lai 
et. al., 2003; Montgomery, 2005; Davis, 2006; Arendt and Hess, 2006)  During 
emergency events, it is critical that state and local emergency management agencies 
(EMAs) have effective communication with and information about area hospitals.  This is 
crucial not only to properly direct the injured from the event (in order to optimize the local 
medical system), but also to ensure that hospitals continue to care for both the patients 
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created by a disaster as well as those already hospitalized.  (Auf der Heide, 1989)  A 
hospital cannot effectively provide patient care if it cannot remain operational nor can it 
easily evacuate as can other types of organizations. 
 
 
Source: Photo by Bill Haber: GPO, 2006. 
 
Figure 2.1. Memorial Medical Center in New Orleans, LA under Floodwaters. 
 
 
   One possible reason for the lack of focus on hospital preparedness and 
coordination with other local response agencies is that the U.S. has been very fortunate 
in historically experiencing low casualty rates during disasters.  However, the recent 
mass casualty components of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina have brought this lack of 
coordination with hospitals to the forefront. (Wachtendorf, 2002)  The importance of 
linkages among EMAs and hospitals could not have been more fully, and more 
tragically, illustrated than in New Orleans in the days following Hurricane Katrina.  It is 
imperative to learn from these mistakes and improve our nation’s emergency 
preparedness. (Montgomery, 2005; Davis, 2006; Arendt and Hess, 2006; GPO, 2006) 
Before proceeding further, it is useful to define certain terms used throughout this 
discussion.  Emergency management is defined as the application of “science, 
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technology, planning, and management to deal with extreme events that can injure or kill 
large numbers of people, do extensive damage to property and disrupt community life”. 
(Drabek and Hoetmer, 1991) Throughout this text, the terms “emergency”, “disaster”, 
and “mass casualty” are used interchangeably to mean a natural or man-made disaster, 
including terrorism events, resulting in injuries to at least 50 people.  (Wright, 1976; 
JCAHO, 2001)   Because this work addresses the relationship between hospitals and 
community emergency managers, it will focus specifically on the coordination of 
communication, resources and information between hospitals and corresponding 
community emergency management agencies.  Accurate information, communicated 
efficiently, is essential to effective resource management.  Therefore, communication, 
information, and resource linkages are considered to be so interdependent throughout 
this work that they will hereafter be referred to as “CIR linkages”.  Only when a 
discussion pertains specifically to one of these three processes and not the others, will it 
be identified as such.   
 CIR linkages are the who, what, why, and how of emergency response:  what 
information is crucial; how can it be transferred quickly and accurately; who needs it; and 
how does one make sense of overwhelming volumes of it during a crisis.  This concept 
and the interrelated value of information management systems was eloquently explained 
in the U.S. House of Representatives special 2006 report entitled, A Failure of Initiative: 
 “The preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina show we are still an 
analog government in a digital age.  We must recognize that we are woefully 
incapable of storing, moving, and accessing information – especially in times of 
crisis. 
 
 Many of the problems we have identified can be categorized as ‘information 
gaps’ – or at least problems with information-related implications, or failures to 
act decisively because information was sketchy at best.   Better information 
would have been the optimal weapon against Katrina.  Information sent to the 
right people at the right place at the right time.  Information moved within 
agencies, across departments, and between jurisdictions of government as well.  
Seamlessly. Securely. Efficiently.   
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 The Federal government is the largest purchaser of information technology in the 
world, by far.  One would think we could share information by now.  But Katrina 
again proved we cannot.” (GPO, 2006) 
 
 This paper reviews historical CIR linkages among EMAs and hospitals, for the 
purpose of synthesizing lessons learned that can be used by a response agency to 
improve CIR linkages.   
 
Published Literature 
 
Literature was reviewed in three distinct areas:  1) coordination of multi-
organizational response to disasters, 2) information and communication technology use 
in emergency management, and 3) hospitals’ role within the community response during 
mass casualty events.  This discussion concentrates specifically on the themes of CIR 
management throughout these three areas.   The literature available concerning 
hospitals focused primarily on medical treatment during mass casualty events or the 
specific response of one hospital during a single event, but did not address coordination 
with other response agencies or other hospitals.  Most literature concerning overall 
medical response during disasters concentrated on EMS response to the site of the 
disaster.   
There are two fairly large spikes in the quantity of literature published on 
emergency management.  The first occurs in 1996-1997, which appears to be a result of 
the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1994 Northridge earthquake in 
California, and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.  The second spike started in 2003, 
presumably as a result of the 9/11 tragedy, and continues today in the wake of the 
Hurricane Katrina. 
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Multi-organizational Response to Disasters   
 
In 1984, James Ginger produced, for the first time, research that treated the 
response to international terrorism as an organization problem; it had been 
characterized as a political, psychological, sociological, ideological, and communications 
problem prior to his work. (Ginger, 1984)  Ginger established the need for an inter-
organizational approach to counter-terrorist response and concluded that no workable 
inter-organizational approach had been effective to date.  He also concluded that there 
was a significant difference in the way “experienced” and “inexperienced” organizations 
planned for terrorism.  Experienced organizations, or those who had actually responded 
to a terrorism event, tended to plan by identifying needed capabilities and then attaining 
these capabilities.  Inexperienced organizations tended to plan by focusing on 
identification of probable events and developing responses to these events.  Ginger 
suggested that an improvement in counter-terrorist response systems would be to 
eliminate contingency planning and replace it with strategic planning which would 
identify critical inter-organizational connections and ensure the creation, maintenance, 
and use of those connections to foster information transfer. (Ginger, 1984)  
In the mid-1990s, Gerald Hinson applied established organizational theories to 
emergency responders by testing three organizations participating in simulated disaster 
responses as part of the Integrated Emergency Management Course designed by 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (Hinson, 1994)   The simulated 
disasters were an earthquake, a flood, and a hurricane.  His research tracked telephone 
contacts within an organization and within functional areas across organizations during 
the events.  Hinson concluded that organizations tended to maintain their hierarchical 
structures throughout the disaster instead of restructuring into tactical teams as was 
planned.  He also found that communication and response efficiencies improved as the 
disaster progressed and the organization learned accordingly.  
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The following year, Robert Duncan conducted a survey of 107 local emergency 
managers and other associated local officials.  (Duncan, 1995)  He attempted to 
measure coordination among local emergency response organizations, including 
volunteer organizations such as the Salvation Army and American Red Cross.  He 
sought to study the question, “Why is it that local emergency management coordination 
is not more effective?”.     
Duncan found that the most common analytic approach in studying inter-
organizational coordination was the use of domain consensus, or to concentrate on 
organizations working within a similar service delivery area or with common clients.  
Most organizations within the same domain are also in a constant struggle for resources, 
often competing with one another.  A scarcity of resources forces inter-organizational 
linkages and exchanges during crises. Therefore, establishing these linkages before a 
mass casualty event occurs was deemed imperative.  
Duncan also discussed the dichotomy between the daily life of local emergency 
managers and their role during a disaster.  A local emergency manager might supervise 
a handful of people at most during routine daily activity.  They might be responsible for a 
small budget with limited physical resources.  However, they would be confronted with 
managing thousands of individuals, multitudes of organizations, tons of supplies, and 
hundreds of problems in the instance that a large-scale disaster occurs.  One of the 
respondents in Duncan’s research likened it to becoming the CEO of a multimillion dollar 
company overnight. This conundrum results in information overload and ineffective 
decision-making by the local emergency manager.  
In 2002, David McEntire published a case study of the response in Fort Worth, 
TX to a tornado that struck on March 28, 2000. (McEntire, 2002)  He characterized the 
multi-organizational response by emergency responders as coordinated and effective.  
Small problems with information management, communication between the Emergency 
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Operations Center (EOC) and field operations, and equipment issues were apparent.  
However, the response was coordinated due to the supportive political leadership of Fort 
Worth, past planning meetings and training activities, pre-existing relationships between 
emergency managers that led to networking and cooperation, experience with previous 
incidents, the effective implementation and use of technology, and a well-equipped and 
strategically located EOC.  McEntire concluded that other municipalities could learn from 
Fort Worth on how to effectively prepare to respond to a disaster.  McEntire’s case study 
of the Fort Worth tornado of 2000 was the only example of relatively effective CIR 
management by a locality in a disaster that could be found in the literature. 
In the 2003 volume of Disaster Prevention and Management, Ronald Perry 
discussed the evolution of Incident Management Systems (IMS), its integration into area 
emergency and disaster management, and common structures of IMS used at the 
municipal level.  IMS is another name for Incident Command System (ICS), discussed 
later within the framework of the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  IMS is 
a management system wherein one individual is designated as Incident Commander 
(IC) and individuals from varying departments or organizations assume functional roles 
as support to the IC.  These individuals are typically housed during an event in an EOC.  
In 2003, IMS was used extensively by those that are first-responders, such as fire, 
police, and EMS, but not by EOCs.  Perry asserted that IMS is a flexible approach for 
organizing emergency operations.   
A study released in May 2004 by the Center for Studying Health System Change 
determined that larger communities exhibit stronger disaster response capabilities than 
smaller communities.  The study, conducted in late 2002, evaluated twelve communities 
throughout the U.S. that varied in size from small (fewer than one million people) to large 
(more than 2.5 million people).  The researchers conducted 132 semi-structured 
telephone and in-person interviews with a variety of key emergency response personnel 
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in each community.  Respondents rated communication among key 
agencies/organizations and information technology (IT) to be among the weakest areas 
of emergency readiness. (McHugh et al, 2004) 
 
Information and Communication Technology Use in Emergency Management   
Information management systems serve a dual purpose in emergency 
management.  These systems can assist with the organization of the vast quantities of 
information generated quickly during a disaster and with the communication of this 
information.  Many new information management and communication technologies have 
been developed in the past decade, commensurate with increased use of the personal 
computer and the Internet.   
Thomas Drabek published the first systematic research into microcomputer use 
in emergency management in 1991.  (Drabek, 1991)  Drabek put forth that: 1) the most 
significant innovation to emergency management was the microcomputer; and 2) no 
research had been initiated to date on the implementation of IT, uses during actual 
disasters, or organizational consequences of the adoption of IT within EMAs.  He 
performed field studies with three state and six local EMAs to assess microcomputer 
adoption and implementation.  He then returned to several of the previously studied 
agencies after a major disaster to assess the degree of fit between actual 
microcomputer use and planned usage.  Drabek concluded that failure to use 
microcomputer capabilities constrained EMA effectiveness and efficiency; 
microcomputers were but one component within a complex communication system; use 
during disaster response was curtailed due to staff inadequacies or unavailability; and 
the absence of computer-based linkages between state and local EMAs was a serious 
constraint on response effectiveness.   
 12 
 
  In 1994, Paul Katzer compared and contrasted two Digital Spatial Database 
Systems for use by local government emergency management. (Katzer, 1994)  He 
compared Emergency Information System (EIS) and ArcInfo GIS.  EIS was a system 
developed specifically for emergency management applications while ArcInfo is a GIS 
that is used in a variety of fields.  Both systems were evaluated in simulations of a flood 
and an industrial accident based on criteria for ease of set-up, ease of analysis, time to 
perform applications, steps to perform applications, and ability to perform data handling.  
Katzer concluded that ArcInfo offered a greater level of flexibility for the local emergency 
manager.  ArcInfo could import and export more data formats than EIS and could 
capture spatial features in different projection systems.  He cautioned, however, that 
more set-up effort was required specifically because of this flexibility.  Overall, ArcInfo 
appeared to be the more robust system.  (Katzer, 1994) 
In 1996, Steven Jensen performed an extensive literature review focusing on the 
adoption and use of information systems in emergency management. (Jensen, 1996)  
He discussed the need for information systems in emergency management due to the 
influx of enormous quantities of information during a disaster and limitations on the 
amount of data that one individual is able to process.  Jensen also discussed how two 
levels of information must be managed simultaneously: a macro-view of the event and a 
micro-view of the details of specific subparts of the event.  It was suggested that 
emergency management is the most spatially oriented of all management sciences and 
that it is essentially a form of information management.   
In 1997, Quarantelli presented ten possible negative consequences of the 
information revolution on disaster planning and research.  (Quarantelli, 1997)  He 
pondered the possibility that technology that is a “means” will be turned into an “end” in 
itself.  Studies by the Disaster Research Center in the 1960’s-1980’s showed that 
emergency response organizations believed that more communication “means” such as 
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radios and walkie-talkies were the answer to their communication problems.  However, 
his research showed that the problem was actually the flow of information content that 
was inaccurate, incomplete or misdirected.  He argued that more field communication 
equipment could not solve this problem.  His discussion also dealt with the inevitable 
information overload.  At some point in a disaster, most of the information would have to 
be assessed and interpreted.  Quarantelli argued that technology could not solve the 
problem of interpretation and meaning.  He explained this concern by stating that “the 
existence of better communication facilities does not necessarily lead in itself to a better 
exchange of knowledge and intelligence, and/or a greater understanding of what is 
occurring.”  
A companion article used a case study approach to evaluate the role of 
information in disaster planning. (Riley and Meadows, 1997)   Riley and Meadows 
evaluated three different mass casualty events and found problems with 
communications due to overloading of the local communication systems as well as 
problems with information flow between emergency response organizations.  Emergency 
plans in place before each of these disasters were concerned mainly with the 
assignment of responsibilities in the short-term, not on information flow.  Plans were 
changed subsequently to ensure effective information flow.   
Also in 1997, Michael Flanagan conducted research on the response to crisis 
through the integration of technology into a virtual consolidated operations center. 
(Flanagan, 1997)  He concluded that: 1) communications and coordination of resources 
presented problems for governmental organizations in responding to disasters, 2) a cost-
benefit analysis of the adoption of GIS technology showed potential improvement in 
communications, and 3) technology could affect a decrease in operational costs while 
previous service levels are maintained.  
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Ann Marie Willis probed the effects of information technology on State EMAs in 
2000.  (Willis, 2000)  She reported that many state, county, and some city EOCs had 
developed integrated data communication capabilities at the time.  Extensive differences 
existed, however, in implementation.  One unexpected finding was that GIS was in little 
use in State EMAs as opposed to its prevalent usage at the county level.  Her conclusion 
was that information management was still a critical and neglected issue in EMAs in 
2000; therefore, not much had changed since the 1960’s.  
An evaluation by Dr. David Bradt of the site management of health issues during 
the World Trade Center disaster of 9/11//2001 addressed this topic. (Bradt, 2003)  He 
espoused the successful use of GIS technologies during the disaster, calling them 
critical to disaster management.  He envisioned GIS professionals as “information first 
responders”, guiding disaster managers in their work in the future.  He illuminated the 
telecommunications challenges during the disaster and explained how hand-held 
technology using wireless applications, such as Palm units, continued to work and 
allowed e-mail transmissions when landlines and cell phones failed.   
The Department of Homeland Security released in January 2007 its “Tactical 
Interoperable Communications Scorecards” for 75 urban/metropolitan areas in the U.S. 
The scorecards evaluated the maturity of interoperable communications within 
governmental agencies, but not with other community organizations such as hospitals. 
(U.S. DHS, 2007)  Also, the DHS study focused on physical communication processes, 
not on determining relationship or organizational issues.  Overall findings show that 
while interoperable communications capabilities have made considerable progress in the 
recent past, solutions have not been readily adopted regionally and are far from 
seamless in most areas.  Even in areas where interoperable technologies have been 
developed, organizational factors have hampered multi-organizational adoption.   
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 A number of electronic information management systems, such as WebEOC, 
Eteam and Reddinet, have proliferated recently to organize hospital information and 
assist EMAs with protecting critical community infrastructure during a mass casualty 
event.  While an important step, many of these systems are only being used by the EMA 
during an actual emergency and not for planning purposes.  There is usually no real-time 
information exchange with medical facilities on their status or needs, nor can the 
hospitals gain access to the information contained in the system.   (EmerGeo, 2006; 
Eteam, 2007; Welsh, 2003; HASC, 2004)  
 
Hospital Response to Mass Casualty Events   
In 1976, Joseph Wright performed research on inter-organizational systems and 
networks in mass casualty situations.  (Wright, 1976)   The focus of Wright’s research 
was the flow of CIR among organizations.  He collected data from ten mass casualty 
events and concluded that the “mass assault” of rescuers in these events leads to the 
uncontrolled allocation of casualties to hospitals.  This uncontrolled allocation leads to an 
inefficient hospital response, with the hospitals located nearest the scene being 
inundated while those that could have absorbed casualties more efficiently were 
uninvolved.  He asserted that communication with hospitals during mass casualty events 
is essential, but difficult. 
Wright also found that vast resources in metropolitan areas were often neither 
mobilized nor organized, resulting in the effective management of fewer casualties than 
one would expect based on their normal load.  Another conclusion was that the most 
effective disaster plans are those that use everyday ways of accomplishing tasks rather 
than trying to replace these prior organizational linkages during an event.  This 
observation highlighted the need for establishing CIR-sharing linkages prior to an actual 
event.  (Wright, 1976) 
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E.L. Quarantelli published a book on emergency medical services in disasters 
that was an extension of Wright’s work.  (Quarantelli, 1983)  He reported that the need 
for improvement in both day-to-day and emergency communications with and among 
hospitals was recognized as far back as 1963 by the Committee on Shock in the Division 
of Medical Sciences of the National Academy of Sciences.  To investigate this concern, 
Quarantelli studied 28 actual mass casualty events and five events with high mass-
casualty potential.   
Quarantelli found CIR management problems with hospitals in virtually all of the 
events studied.  Either hospitals were never notified of the event or they received 
inaccurate information.  Emergency managers generally had little information on the 
status of the area hospitals either before or after an event.  Quarantelli’s conclusion was 
that the overall effectiveness and efficiency in the handling of medical casualties in a 
disaster depended on how well the local medical care system, including hospitals, 
responded as a whole.  He asserted that it was the hospital response as a “system” that 
was important.  The relationship between information, communication, and emergency 
medical response was described by Quarantelli as, “Without full and correct information 
flow, there can be no valid communication.  Without appropriate communications, 
coordination of efforts suffer.  If there is weak coordination, there can be, at best, only a 
loosely integrated response.  At both the EMS component or system level, this is 
frequently the character of the situation which prevails in the EMS response to 
disasters.”  
Quarantelli also noted a general trend of larger communities having more 
coordination problems in EMS response than smaller communities.  He hypothesized 
that this could be a result of the higher number of hospitals and agencies that require 
coordination in a disaster in a larger community.  He also suggested the domain 
consensus explanation discussed earlier by Duncan.  (Duncan, 1995)  He believed that 
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pre-existing linkages were vital as natural communication pathways during a mass 
casualty event.  His research found these linkages were generally non-existent in larger 
communities prior to a disaster.  
Quarantelli’s research is considered a seminal work in the understanding of 
hospital and EMS response to mass casualty events and is referenced in almost every 
document found during this literature review.  His effort was the first, and arguably the 
most comprehensive, systematic and comparative study of the delivery of emergency 
medical care during disasters. 
Moving forward, Bridget O’Brien concluded in her research that, “whether a 
disaster causes 25 or 25,000 injuries, careful coordination is essential for delivering 
victims to facilities which can effectively manage the level of injury.  Simply taking all the 
injured to the nearest facility is quite possibly the worst ‘system’ of resource utilization”. 
(O’Brien, 1991)  She asserted that the overwhelmed system would no longer be able to 
meet the minimum needs of the victims of a mass casualty event, much less concentrate 
on special cases.  O’Brien also found that most patient tracking systems, including the 
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), had hospitals report their bed availability 
based on acute or non-acute.  However, casualties are triaged by injury type, such as 
orthopedic, burn, etc.  (Auf der Heide, 1989) This mismatch in information could lead to 
an ineffective allocation of resources during an actual mass casualty event.  
In 1996, a survey of 526 emergency nurses was conducted to determine their 
knowledge of disaster procedures and management.  (Haney, 1996) Nurses are central 
to the management of any operation within a hospital, are commonly found in 
administrative roles, and far outnumber the physicians available at any time.  Haney 
found that proper pre-hospital triage can prevent any one hospital from being overloaded 
with too many critical patients and could be the key to the management of mass 
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casualties. The need for communication, both internal and external to the hospital, was 
considered crucial for disaster operations.  
In 2001, Kimberly Treat and her colleagues queried personnel at 30 hospitals on 
the level of preparedness, mass decontamination capabilities, training of hospital staff 
and security capabilities for WMD incidents.  (Treat et. al., 2001)  They reported that 
WMD preparedness had been incorporated into only 27% of hospital disaster plans and 
73% were capable of setting up only a single-room decontamination process.  Only 10% 
had the ability to handle more than 50 casualties.  One-fifth stated that disaster drills for 
WMD events had been conducted. This study, when compared to the Braun et. al. 2006 
work performed for JCAHO (discussed later), is illustrative of advances in hospital 
preparedness activities made in just the few years since 9/11. 
In 2003, Rory Connell conducted focus group interviews with representatives 
from numerous hospitals in California, Tennessee, and New York.  He found that 
hospitals have limited financial resources and are reluctant to invest them in disaster 
preparedness.  Additionally, hospitals implemented only the measures required by 
regulation or by their accreditation agencies.   (Connell, 2003) 
The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released a Report to Congressional 
Committees in August 2003, entitled “Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals 
Have Emergency Plans but Lack Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response”.  The 
GAO conducted a survey of 1,489 urban hospitals in the 50 largest Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) across the county.  The questionnaire addressed emergency 
room functionality and hospital preparedness for bioterrorism.  In its report, the GAO 
explained how the demand for health care could quickly outstrip the ability of hospitals to 
respond during a mass casualty event.   (GAO, 2003)  Hospitals across the country have 
been operating at or near surge capacity and are reluctant to spend money to stockpile 
resources and create surge capacity that is not needed on a routine basis and might 
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never be used.  The report asserted that “hospitals would need to be able to 
communicate easily with all organizations involved in the response as events unfold and 
critical information is acquired” in order to provide for the sharing of resources among 
hospitals and other organizations that may be in short supply on a local level during an 
emergency.  The survey showed that larger hospitals had emergency plans that covered 
more functions and had more inter-agency agreements than smaller hospitals.   
St. Vincent’s Manhattan Hospital, the closest Level 1 trauma center to the World 
Trade Center, learned from the 9/11 experience that additional communication methods 
were needed for both system-wide communications within St. Vincent’s hospital system 
and city-wide.  They began developing data sharing systems that identify excess 
hospital capacity, needed resources and the location of patients in treatment.  
Resources were expended to enhance system-wide preparedness for future disasters, 
including the development of communication systems to assure efficient sharing of 
resources between hospitals within the St. Vincent system. (Ackerman, 2003) 
Trust for America’s Health (TFAH) is a non-profit, non-partisan organization that 
has published an annual report since 2003 which assesses state preparedness to 
protect the public from diseases, disasters, and bioterrorism.  TFAH evaluates state 
preparedness activities against a set of indicators developed to ensure effective 
response to biological health threats.  In the five years since 9/11, TFAH found that the 
nation is “only modestly better prepared to respond to health threats than prior to the 
2001 tragedies.”  Public health preparedness is still not considered by this group to be at 
an acceptable level. (TFAH, 2005; TFAH, 2006)   
A number of studies have been published that investigate the impact on hospitals 
in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina.  Particularly illuminating are the “A Failure of 
Initiative” report and a qualitative study of all 15 hospitals in New Orleans Parish that 
investigated hospital decision-making with regards to evacuation or shelter-in-place. 
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(GPO, 2006; Arendt and Hess, 2006)  Arendt and Hess interviewed hospital executives 
and staff members, who were asked to evaluate their hospitals’ emergency plans and 
other planning documents to discern the organizational decisions that were made.  A 
primary finding was that no hospital had a well-developed plan for full evacuation.  
Moreover, administrators at New Orleans’ hospitals were so jaded with regards to 
hurricanes that they never thought “it could happen to them”, and therefore did not plan 
for a two-stage scenario such as a hurricane/levee break or for a full hospital evacuation.  
The plans that were reviewed were based on event types, not capabilities, and quickly 
became useless in the ongoing stages of crisis that occurred.  Lessons learned included 
the need for all-hazards, scalable plans, along with thorough training and drilling.  
Additionally, even though New Orleans is below sea level, most hospitals had their 
generators, supplies and food stocks stored on ground floors.  One of the most important 
lessons learned by these hospitals was how invaluable their pre-established 
relationships and networks became during the event.  These linkages with governmental 
agencies, other hospitals, and anyone else they could think of became a lifeline for 
evacuation methods, supplies, relief personnel, and information. (GPO, 2006; Arendt 
and Hess, 2006; Maher, 2005; Montgomery, 2005; Davis, 2006) 
 
 
Review of Major National Policy Initiatives Involving Linkages Among Emergency 
Management Agencies and Hospitals 
 
The Federal government has recognized the need for preparedness and 
planning for mass casualty events, both natural and man-made, for many decades.  As a 
result, there have been five major national initiatives to coordinate medical response to 
mass casualty events in addition to the December 2006 signing of the “Pandemic and 
All-Hazards Preparedness Act” by President Bush.  (Bush, 2006) Billions of dollars have 
been distributed through these initiatives with questionable results.  Each of these 
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national initiatives is discussed in this section, with a focus on the themes of CIR 
linkages between EMAs and hospitals.  
 
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) 
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a Federally coordinated 
system that supplements the nation’s emergency medical response capability.  Initiated 
by President Reagan in 1982, the NDMS was originally a partnership between the US 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Department of Veteran Affairs (VA), 
and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). (Natarajan, 2004)  The NDMS 
was moved to the Department of Homeland Security and then back to the DHHS as of 
January 1, 2007. (Bush, 2006) The purpose of the NDMS is to establish a single, 
integrated national medical response capability for assisting state and local authorities in 
responding to disasters.  It has the dual purpose of supporting the Department of 
Defense and Veterans Affairs medical systems in caring for casualties returning from 
overseas conflicts. (NDMS, 2003) 
 The National Disaster Medical System is comprised of 72 Federal Coordinating 
Centers (FCCs), as shown in Figure 2.2, located in major metropolitan areas with large 
concentrations of hospitals in close proximity to airports.  These 72 FCCs are Army, 
Navy, Air Force, or VA hospitals that coordinate a network of 2,000 non-Federal 
hospitals.  The FCCs enroll the non-Federal hospitals and then coordinate bed 
availability and patient reception during an incident.  An additional component of the 
NDMS is the creation of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) and International 
Medical Surgical Response Teams (IMSURTs).  These medical teams are volunteer 
groups of health and medical professionals that can mobilize to remote locations both 
within and outside the US.  The NDMS provides medical response teams, supplies, and 
equipment to an affected area, assists with the movement of patients to unaffected 
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areas of the country, and ensures definitive medical care at participating hospitals in 
unaffected areas. (NDMS, 2003)  The NDMS is only activated when state resources 
have been overwhelmed and a request has been made by the state for federal 
assistance. 
 
Figure 2.2.  NDMS Federal Coordinating Centers. 
 
 
The NDMS is equipped to manage patient data through the TRAC2ES computer 
system for patient reception or reverse patient flow.  However, it requires 72 hours to 
activate the NDMS.  Therefore, the NDMS computer system does not supplant the need 
for locally-devised systems to immediately manage patient and resource flow, and that 
are compatible with the NDMS computer system.  (Thresher, 2003) 
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Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)  
 
The Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) was created by the  
National Defense Authorization Act of 1997.   Its purpose is to assist localities with 
preparation for mass casualty events by awarding grants to local jurisdictions to improve 
their response capabilities, specifically to WMD events.  The MMRS program was 
transferred from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003.  MMRS has been the only Federal 
program which directly supports the linkages among all the local elements essential in 
managing a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) mass casualty event.  As a byproduct 
of preparing for WMD events, these enhancements also increase capabilities to manage 
mass casualty events caused by hazardous materials incidents, disease outbreaks, or 
natural disasters.  (MMRS, 2004)  As of 2003, there were 124 designated MMRS 
regions (see Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Source: MMRS, 2004. 
 
Figure 2.3.  MMRS Regions. 
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In any disastrous event, whether natural or manmade, the locality will have as its 
primary focus the management of the mass casualties; thus, local medical response 
capability is a critical component of a viable national disaster management system.  
Over time, response to a large incident will move from a local to a state response, then 
to a national response level once the state response capabilities are overwhelmed.  
Therefore, the government established the MMRS to provide equipment and money to 
enhance local response capabilities for the first 72 hours of an incident until the NDMS 
can be activated (see Figure 2.4). 
 
Source:  MMRS, 2004. 
 
Figure 2.4. Effect of Policy Initiatives on Local Medical Response. 
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The primary focus of the MMRS is WMD and other incidents that would require 
decontamination of patients in addition to medical response.  Decontamination 
complicates response to a nuclear, chemical, or biological material because the medical 
workers must be protected from contamination.  Much of the money provided by MMRS 
has been designated for decontamination supplies and personal protective equipment, 
such as respirators and protective suits for first responders and hospital emergency 
department personnel.  All organizations within the local MMRS, such as hospitals, fire 
departments, law enforcement, EMS, local metro and state emergency management 
agencies, must share the funding received. (MMRS, 2003a) 
 MMRS has been the only Federal program to directly support local linkages 
essential in managing a WMD mass casualty event.  To be effective, however, it must be 
interoperable with Federal response programs such as NDMS and NIMS, as discussed 
below.   
 
National Incident Management System (NIMS)  
In March 2004, Director Tom Ridge of the Department of Homeland Security 
announced the creation of a National Incident Management System (NIMS).  The intent 
of the system was to “provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, local 
and tribal governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, prevent, 
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or 
complexity.”  (Ridge, 2004) 
NIMS was created in response to Presidential Directive, HSPD-5, “Management 
of Domestic Incidents” issued in February 2003.  (Bush, 2003)  This Presidential 
directive required all Federal departments and agencies to adopt NIMS immediately and 
required Federal agencies to make adoption of NIMS by state and local organizations a 
condition of Federal preparedness assistance beginning in FY 2005.  The document 
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established the basic concepts and structure of NIMS, with the development and 
refinement of national standards, guidelines, protocols, systems, and technologies to 
occur in the near future. 
NIMS standardizes philosophy, concepts, principles, terminology and 
organizational processes of emergency management and integrates Federal 
government domestic prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into a 
single, all-disciplines, all-hazards plan.  The basic principle of NIMS is standardization; 
however, the creators acknowledged the need to strike a workable balance between 
standardization and flexibility.   
 The six major components of the NIMS plan are Command and Management, 
Preparedness, Resource Management, Communications and Information Management, 
Supporting Technologies, and Ongoing Management and Maintenance.  (DHS, 2004) 
The foundation of the NIMS command and management structure is the Incident 
Command System (ICS), multi-agency coordination systems using Unified Command, 
and the Joint Information System (JIS).  The Incident Command System integrates 
facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications from all organizations 
participating in an emergency response within one common organizational structure.  
The system is familiar to many emergency response organizations and has been readily 
adopted throughout the country by typical emergency response agencies such as fire 
and police. It is similar to the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS) 
system that has been used by hospitals for a number of years.  HEICS has now been 
updated and integrated with HICS IV, which is a hybrid version of the original HEICS that 
is NIMS-compliant for hospitals. 
The NIMS Integration Center issued a “NIMS Alert” in September 2006, 
launching the “NIMS Implementation Activities for Hospitals and Healthcare Systems” 
guidance.  This new guidance document was developed as a collaboration between 
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DHHS and the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program (NBHPP).  The 
NBHPP required hospitals to meet the NIMS implementation requirements during the 
FY2006 funding cycle.  (FEMA, 2006b; FEMA, 2006c)  The implementation guidance 
document includes 17 elements that are to be addressed in a hospital’s emergency 
management program documentation.  These range from adopting and training on ICS, 
to linking the Hospital Command Center with local EOCs and 911 centers, to maintaining 
response supply and equipment inventories as well as establishing memoranda of 
understanding or vendor contracts to obtain additional supplies.  
In addition to hospital standards, the NIMS Integration Center developed 
guidance documents for Communications and Information Management and for 
Resource Management that were issued in March 2006.  These guidance “fact sheets” 
outline concepts and principles for effective resource management, interoperability 
standards, information technology (including wireless applications) and standardized 
status reporting.  They do not yet provide specific requirements, but are useful for 
organizations to improve planning in these areas. (FEMA, 2006d; FEMA, 2006e) 
The new NIMS requirements address many of the issues discussed in this 
research and should drive hospitals to improve CIR linkages with local EMAs, if adopted 
universally and without undue financial burden. Overall, it is clear that the Department of 
Homeland Security recognizes that CIR linkages among hospitals and EMAs are integral 
in community-wide response.    
  
National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program (NBHPP) 
 
The DHHS created the Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Program in FY 2002.  
The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) provided significant funds to 
states and eligible municipalities to enhance the capacity of hospitals and associated 
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health care entities to respond to bioterrorism.  (JCAHO, 2003)  “The vision of the 
NBHPP is for U.S. hospitals and the supporting healthcare systems to provide 
immediate and effective healthcare through a well-trained and equipped workforce to 
minimize morbidity and mortality in the event of a terrorist attack or other public health 
emergency.” (DHHS, 2007) 
To be eligible for funding, each entity is required to submit detailed 
implementation plans addressing critical benchmarks.  These benchmarks include: 1) 
establishing a Hospital Bioterrorism Preparedness Planning Committee in each area 
which consists of State and local health departments, EMAs, and the hospital community 
as well as others, such as police and fire; 2) creating a timeline for a state-wide plan for 
response to a bioterrorism event, infectious disease outbreak, or other public health 
emergency; 3) creating regional plans for responding to a mass casualty event or 
epidemic including at least 500 patients; 4) developing a plan to distribute critical 
vaccines or antibiotics on a 24/7 basis; and 5) developing a plan for communication 
systems that provide 24/7 (and redundant) flow of critical health information between 
hospital emergency departments, state and local health departments, and law 
enforcement.  (Agrabrite, 2003)  Additionally, the DHHS required a plan for “electronic 
tracking of bed status across the State with a central device or system, and how this 
information will be updated continuously to maintain currency”.    
Research on websites of local OEMs and State EMAs across the county as well 
as personal communication with representatives of these offices has indicates that most 
chose GIS to meet this requirement.  (Nashville OEM, 2003)  Hospitals call or fax in their 
information on a periodic basis and someone, usually in a local OEM, updates the 
system.  Others use Access databases or other internal systems unique to their area.  
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(GNYHA, 2003; HASC, 2004)  These systems focus on bed status or epidemiological 
information of hospitals, not capability, operational or resource issues.  
In September 2003, DHHS increased the funding for this program “for states to 
develop surge capacity to deal with mass casualty events”. (DHHS, 2003a; DHHS, 
2007)  These additionally resources were directed at the expansion of the number of 
hospital beds, development of isolation capacity, identifying additional health care 
personnel, establishing hospital-based pharmaceutical caches, providing trauma and 
burn care, enhanced communications, and personal protective equipment.  Distribution 
of funding has been slow and generally considered by the public health community to be 
insignificant relative to the need. (McHugh et al, 2004; NFTC, 2004) 
According to the DHHS Fact Sheet entitled, “Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness: Transforming America’s Capacity to Respond”, internal public health 
system communications have improved.  (DHHS, 2003b)  As of September 2003 when 
the publication was released, 42 states could send and receive public health information 
among hospitals, emergency departments, state and local officials and law enforcement 
through the Public Health Information Network (PHIN) and the EPI-X system. 
Additionally, all states had plans with their hospitals for dealing with epidemics of at least 
500 patients.  As of FY2005, 89% of jurisdictions had some sort of communication 
system in place with local emergency management agencies.  97% had portable or fixed 
decontamination systems, but only 87% had personal protective equipment for hospitals 
personnel to use the decontamination systems. (DHHS, 2007) 
 
TOPOFF Exercises 
 In 1998, the U.S. Congress directed the Attorney General and FEMA to 
undertake a mass casualty exercise that involved all key Federal personnel. (Colvin, 
2003)  In 2000, the Department of Justice conducted a drill that tested the readiness of 
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top government officials to respond to terrorist attacks directed at multiple geographic 
locations.  The exercise was called “TOPOFF” (top officials) and simulated a chemical 
weapon attack in Portsmouth, NH, a radiological attack in Washington, DC, and a 
bioweapons attack in Denver, CO.  (Inglesby et. al., 2001) 
 The Denver attack simulated the release of plague aerosol (Yersinia pestis), 
which eventually led to more than 2,000 cases of pneumonic plague with hundreds of 
simulated deaths.  The unannounced exercise took place over three days in May, 2000 
and involved hundreds of personnel from the county health agency, state health agency, 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), Office of Emergency Preparedness, Public Health 
Services as well as three Denver hospitals.  (Hoffman and Norton, 2000) 
 Inglesby et. al. discussed lessons learned from the Denver portion of the drill.  
(Inglesby et.al., 2001)  Communication failed in many instances.  Officials using 800 
MHz radios did not report communication problems while regular phone lines became 
highly dysfunctional.  “Hospital officials in particular had great difficulty communicating 
by phone with the health department or others involved in consequence management”. 
Inglesby pointed out that hospitals needed to communicate with and receive support 
from a wide variety of organizations, including other hospitals, and that the capacity for 
efficient communication throughout the health care system during a crisis should have 
already been built. 
 Antibiotic distribution and resource management quickly became inoperable.  
Hospitals were competing for ventilators and antibiotics.   The authors viewed it as 
critical that the local community have the capability to efficiently and rapidly distribute 
antibiotics and other resources, such as simple face masks, to where they were needed.
 The flow of information was also reported as a major concern.  Participants were 
unsure how decision-makers would know whether a hospital was overwhelmed.  
Decisions were made, then overturned within hours, only to be reinstated a few hours 
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later.  Inglesby asserted that decision-making in such a crisis requires information 
sources and conduits that did not exist in 2000.  The development of information 
systems that deliver real-time data and allow decision-makers to communicate efficiently 
with hospitals is vital to improving future response capabilities to bioweapon attacks.   
 In March 2003, responsibility for the TOPOFF exercises was transferred from the 
Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security.  (Colvin, 2003)  
Therefore, the DHS had responsibility for conducting TOPOFF 2.  Whereas the original 
TOPOFF was designed as a single event, no-notice exercise, TOPOFF 2 was organized 
as a cycle of exercise activities that increased in complexity.  A series of seminars 
explored various emergency response issues, culminating in a Top Officials seminar to 
prepare for the upcoming full-scale exercise.  The objective of the “open” design was to 
strengthen relationships within the national response community using a building-block 
approach. (DHS, 2003) 
 TOPOFF 2 included a combination of natural disasters and terrorism events, 
“designed to overwhelm local, state, and federal agencies in Seattle, King County, 
Pierce County and the State of Washington, as well as in Chicago and its surrounding 
counties. British Columbia and Ottawa, Canada also participated”. (May, 2003)     
On May 12, a Radiological Dispersal Device exploded in Seattle at the same time 
that Chicago hospitals were reporting an increase in unknown illnesses.  On May 13, 
2003, a bomb exploded on a transit bus south of Tacoma, WA on which terrorists were 
holding hostages.  On May 14, the Washington State ferry had a hostile takeover.  For 
36 hours, participants struggled to respond to the cascade of events.  The exercise 
concluded on May 16, 2003.  (May, 2003) 
 In Chicago, 64 hospitals participated in the exercise, making it the largest mass 
casualty drill ever undertaken.    The Department of Homeland Security, in its After 
Action Summary Report, concluded that there were significant challenges regarding 
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communication and the management of resource requirements during TOPOFF 2.  DHS 
found that the “lack of a robust and efficient emergency communications infrastructure 
was apparent.” (DHS, 2003)  The communication system in place relied on telephones 
and faxes, which were quickly overwhelmed.  Additionally, there was little electronic data 
capture; information was copied manually to a form, faxed, and then manually tabulated 
on another form before being entered into an information system. (DHS, 2003) 
During the radiological incident, incident command did not provide periodic 
information updates to hospital control.  The hospitals were unaware of the need to 
conduct more detailed risk-benefit analysis before commencing treatment, nor were the 
hospitals aware of periodic work stoppages at the explosion site. 
 An additional challenge was hospital resource demands.  Hospitals were 
competing for the same pool of supplemental resources since they had little on hand.  
Staff and isolation/negative pressure rooms presented special issues, with extra 
conference rooms, lobbies and other labs eventually being turned into negative pressure 
rooms and isolation wards.  Cumbersome procedures and insufficient electronic means 
to track resource status taxed hospital staff in most cases. (DHS, 2003) 
 TOPOFF 3 was an announced exercise conducted from April 4-8, 2005, involving 
27 federal, 30 state, and 44 local governmental departments and agencies, in addition to 
156 private sector organizations from New Jersey, Connecticut, United Kingdom and 
Canada.  By any measure, TOPOFF 3 was the most ambitious civilian terrorism 
response exercise ever conducted, taking a year to plan at a cost of $21 million; it was 
also the first opportunity for DHS to manage an entire exercise of this magnitude.  The 
exercise was unique in that it incorporated the National Response Plan, NIMS, pre-
exercise intelligence play, private sector organizations, and the Department of Defense. 
(DHS, 2005) 
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TOPOFF 3 simulated releases of pneumonic plague in Union and Middlesex 
counties in New Jersey, and mustard gas and a high-yield explosive in New London, 
Connecticut.  These exercises were linked to the “Atlantic Blue” exercises in United 
Kingdom and “Triple Play” exercises in Canada. (DHS, 2005) 
While the overall objectives of the exercise were met, a number of opportunities 
for improvement were discovered.  Confusion in incident command and response 
coordination was common, although DHS felt that future compliance with NIMS should 
reduce these conflicts.  It was also found that information collection and dissemination 
needed standardization, and formidable challenges in the treatment and sharing of key 
information were present.  “The secured messaging system and information collection 
and reporting structure in place for exercise participants were insufficient to process, 
prioritize, and track the volume of information flowing among participants.”  DHS 
recommended the design of an information management system for use in future 
exercises to standardize format and methodology for collecting information, and to allow 
for more open and efficient tracking and sharing of information.  DHS also recommended 
the development of best practices and lessons learned from private industry to facilitate 
information management and sharing. (DHS, 2005) 
 
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
 President Bush signed the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act into law 
in December 2006. (Bush, 2006)  This act is focused on improving public health and 
hospital emergency preparedness, and consolidates authority for the NDMS, the Medical 
Reserve Corps, the Strategic National Stockpile and other public health preparedness 
efforts under the new Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response within DHHS.  
Additionally, it requires the development of a National Health Security Strategy in 2009 
for coordinated public health preparedness and response measured against evidence-
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based benchmarks.  Other notable requirements are the establishment of a nationwide, 
near real-time electronic system to share critical public health and medical information 
using an interoperable network of information management systems, and the 
requirement of the Secretary to award grants directly to hospital and healthcare facilities 
to improve surge capacity and to enhance community and hospital preparedness.  This 
law could prove to be the most significant development to date in the advancement of 
overall hospital emergency preparedness, in addition to specific CIR linkages among 
hospitals, if all initiatives are fully implemented. 
 
Joint Commission on Accreditation for Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)  
The Joint Commission on Accreditation for Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) is 
an independent, not-for-profit organization which “is the nation's predominant standards-
setting and accrediting body in health care.” (JCAHO, 2004a)  The Joint Commission 
evaluates and accredits more than 16,000 health care organizations and programs in the 
United States. JCAHO accreditation is essentially a seal of approval recognized 
nationwide that indicates an organization has met performance standards set by a board 
of medical professionals.    
 Although JCAHO has had disaster preparedness requirements for its members 
for many years, they were focused mainly on operational issues that could befall an 
institution such as loss of water or power.  These requirements were significantly 
upgraded in January 2001 to require a full-scale hazard vulnerability analysis 
encompassing all hazards, whether manmade or natural, intentional or unintentional.  
The Environment of Care standard EC 4.10 required emergency preparedness plans to 
address the four phases of emergency management activities of mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery.  This standard required, among other things:  
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1) the definition and integration of each hospital’s role with that of the 
community emergency response agencies, 
2) cooperative agreements with health care organizations within a contiguous 
geographic area to establish a process to share information about the 
emergency control centers as well as resources and assets that could be 
pooled in a community emergency response, and  
3) the establishment of backup internal and external communication systems. 
 
Environment of Care standard EC 4.20 also required a hospital to execute its 
plan by conducting emergency management drills.  The standard required drills to be 
performed twice annually, with one of these drills including an influx of volunteer or 
simulated patients (mass casualty), and participation in an annual community-wide drill 
which assesses communication, coordination, and the effectiveness of the organization’s 
and community’s command structures. (JCAHO, 2001) 
In December 2006, JCAHO issued proposed revisions to the Emergency 
Management Standards Field Review that resulted from a variety of disasters impacting 
health care organizations between 2001 and 2006.  The revisions included the 
expansion of planning to develop scalable capacities, core organizational capabilities, 
and long-term resource management plans to manage the “variety, intensity, and 
duration of disasters that may actually be encountered.”  (JCAHO, 2006) 
 JCAHO also acts as an education and advocacy entity for healthcare 
organizations.  In March 2003, JCAHO released a white paper entitled, “Health Care at 
the Crossroads: Strategies for Creating and Sustaining Community-wide Emergency 
Preparedness Systems”.  This document was meant as a “call to action for those who 
influence, develop or carry out policies that will lead the way to resolution of the issue.” 
(JCAHO, 2003)  In this paper, JCAHO explained that the concept of community-wide 
preparedness is new to most health care organizations as they have typically operated  
in isolation, and their disaster plans reflect this mindset.  JCAHO recognized that 
hospitals had been asked to step up their level of emergency preparedness involvement, 
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but countered that it was occurring at a time when severe resource constraints are 
prevalent and most hospitals cannot manage current day-to-day patient care demands. 
(JCAHO, 2003) 
 JCAHO’s assertion was that 9/11 and the anthrax attacks highlighted new 
fundamental needs for emergency preparedness that required leadership and 
coordination at the community level which previously did not exist.  “In most 
communities, there is no team, nor teamwork, among public health agencies, healthcare 
provider organizations, and other municipal and county leaders.  And, there is no 
community emergency preparedness plan, nor program, nor system”. (JCAHO, 2003) 
 Many hospitals and even more emergency departments closed over the past two 
decades as public policy reduced the installed capacity of the U.S. health care delivery 
system.  The American Hospital Association (AHA) reported that there were 900 fewer 
hospitals in 2002 than in 1980.   However, demand for services had not diminished; 
therefore, many hospitals are experiencing critical shortages of personnel, space, and 
resources.  Most hospitals and emergency rooms are chronically overcrowded and are 
likely to be diverting patients on any given day, absent any external disaster. (The Lewin 
Group, 2002)  The hospitals that remain open face ever shrinking operational profit 
margins, a loss of qualified medical personnel, and an increasing naivety by the public 
and political communities that hospitals are adequately preparing for terrorism events 
and catastrophic casualty loads. (Barbera et.al., 2002) 
 The Joint Commission white paper lampooned the “much ballyhooed” billions of 
federal dollars being poured into antiterrorism efforts.  It maintained that very few of 
these funds are trickling down to the local community level, with most hospitals having 
yet to see “their first nickel” of federal terrorism preparedness money. (JCAHO, 2003)   
 The white paper outlined recommendations based on JCAHO’s Public Policy 
Initiative, which included roundtable discussions and national symposia with those who 
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have had experience with recent, large disaster events..  The first key idea was to 
facilitate community-based emergency preparedness instead of organization-focused 
approaches of the past.  The second set of recommendations identified the need for a 
definition of surge capacity at the federal or state level, so that there can be an effective 
communication of needs within and across communities.  Supplies should be stockpiled 
to anticipate stand-alone capacity for 48-72 hours, and mutual aid agreements should be 
established among community hospitals and other health care organizations.  This latter 
set of recommendations held information management as key.  The creation of 
redundant, interoperable communication systems and centralized community-wide 
patient locator systems was considered critical.   
 The third set of recommendations involved the establishment of accountability 
and oversight of community preparedness systems.  JCAHO called on the federal and 
state governments to provide adequate and sustainable funding for hospital emergency 
preparedness planning and to assure that these funds actually reach the local level.  
JCAHO clearly delineated the absence of, and need for, research on the development of 
standards to actually measure community readiness for emergencies, and for templates 
and models for what constitutes acceptable community emergency preparedness.  
Existing best practices and lessons learned should be distributed in a standardized form 
to community organizations, hospitals, and other affected organizations.   
 JCAHO asserted that hospitals usually still fulfill their mission to treat and protect 
patients in the face of dire circumstances, but this has been based on the tenacity and 
resourcefulness of the hospital staff rather than on prepared and planned responses to 
disaster.  They outlined these recommendations and needs from the health care 
community perspective in issuing a “call to action” to the Federal government and state 
governments across the country.  JCAHO clearly believed that while much has been 
touted, little has been actually done to increase the nation’s capacity for response to 
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disasters and that the country was again becoming complacent to the threat of terrorism.  
JCAHO closed its paper by stating that, “This country should not need another major 
disaster in order to understand the degree of its vulnerability.  The time to begin to 
develop true emergency preparedness capabilities across America’s communities is 
now”. (JCAHO, 2003) 
 Subsequent to the white paper, JCAHO conducted a study to assess changes in 
bioterrorism preparedness linkages between hospitals and key community entities 
before and after 9/11.  A self-administered questionnaire was sent to all hospitals due for 
accreditation in April-May 2001 and then those due in May-June 2002.  Data was 
gathered on hospital-specific emergency management plans for bioterrorism, hospital 
perception of community-wide bioterrorism emergency management plans, hospital 
perception of community coordination, and hospital demographic information.  68 
hospitals participated in 2001 and 97 in 2002.   Planning-related indicators showed the 
greatest improvement, while items related to equipment, electronic information sharing, 
and training showed the least improvement. (Braun et. al., 2004) 
 In 2004, JCAHO and the George Washington University Institute for Crisis, 
Disaster, and Risk Management conducted a follow-up to the 2001/2002 study.  
Hospitals self-reported their prevalence and breadth of participation in community-wide 
planning based on the examination of 17 basic elements in a weighted analysis.  The 
assessment found that hospitals self-reported substantial integration, but that 
relationships between hospitals and other critical response agencies were still not 
sufficiently robust. (Braun et. al, 2006)  The limitations of both the JCAHO studies are 
that they focused only on hospitals and their perceptions of community linkages, with no 
cross-correlation to the linked community organizations.  
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Conclusions and Opportunities to Strengthen CIR Linkages among Hospitals and 
EMAs 
 
From reviewing the literature, the following can be said about multi-organization 
response to disasters, information and communication technology usage by EMAs, and 
hospitals’ roles in community emergency response: 
 
¾ Large increases in funding and importance surrounding mass casualty response 
have occurred since 9/11/2001, but CIR linkages remain less than optimal.  
 
¾ Federal policy initiatives aimed at improving mass casualty response have not 
been fully implemented or effective to date.  
 
¾ CIR linkages among emergency management agencies and area 
hospitals have been shown to be critical to response, but ineffective 
during recent mass casualty events or drills.  
 
¾ No entity has responsibility for assisting hospitals in obtaining resources 
or maintaining operations during a crisis.  
 
¾ Hospitals across the country are operating at or near surge capacity and 
could be easily overwhelmed in a mass casualty event.  
 
¾ Geographical information systems have been shown to improve 
information management and the ability to communicate information 
within and between organizations.  
 
¾ Internet-based technologies can be useful during a mass casualty event and 
should not be assumed to become non-functional as landlines and cell phones 
typically do. 
 
¾ The need for evidence-based research to produce useful emergency 
management models and templates is well-recognized.   
 
Specific findings that could be used to strengthen CIR linkages among hospitals 
and EMAs towards improved mass casualty response include: 
¾ Community-wide organizational response to disasters is best 
characterized and modeled as a complex organization. 
  
¾ Larger communities tend to have more problems with organizational 
structure and linkages than small communities. 
 
¾ Local communities should be the lead organization in disaster response 
and should plan to be on their own for a minimum of 72 hours. 
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¾ Experienced organizations plan for capabilities while inexperienced organizations 
plan for events. 
 
¾ Emergency managers and decision-makers are quickly overwhelmed with 
information during emergencies, leading to information overload and 
ineffective decision making.  
 
¾ Emergency management is the most-spatially oriented of all management 
sciences and can benefit greatly from computer tools that display maps and 
relational databases.  
 
¾ Establishing relationships prior to a crisis improves response and 
coordination. 
 
¾ Incorporating daily operations into planning efforts improves response 
and coordination. 
 
¾ Organizations working within a similar service delivery area are in a constant 
competition for resources.  Lack of resources during an event forces inter-
organizational linkages, but this is much more efficient when developed and 
planned for pre-event.  
 
¾ Hospital response as a system is more critical to effective medical care during a 
crisis than individual hospital response.  
 
¾ Each hospital in a local area has capabilities and resources that are 
unique. 
 
¾ Uncontrolled allocation of casualties to hospitals leads to inefficient hospital 
response and lives lost.  
 
¾ Efforts are underway to improve patient tracking systems using GIS.   
 
¾ Hospitals generally implement only measures required by law or JCAHO. 
 
¾ Interoperable communication “means” are not the answer to the communication 
problem; improving the flow of information is the solution.  
 
¾ Most common, currently used communication methods, such as phones and 
radios, are a one-to-one or one-to-many communication method which restricts 
communication and the distribution of information. 
 
 
Strong CIR linkages can then be summarized to result from the following behaviors: 
 
9 An institutional commitment to emergency planning and preparedness; 
 
9 Planning with an all-hazards approach and for common response capabilities, 
such as communication, information sharing and management, and resource 
acquisition; 
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9 Pre-event collaboration and coordination of responding agencies through: 
 
– coordination of written plans and hazard analyses,  
 
– establishment of interpersonal relationships prior to actual response,  
 
– use of common language/lingo/structure during response, and 
 
– development of interoperable and redundant communication methods. 
 
9 Use of web-based information management systems such as GIS which:  
 
– improve response providing many-to-many communication methods,  
 
– reduction of “information overload” on participants in the crisis, and  
 
– improved accuracy and timeliness of information transfers. 
 
 
In order for these behaviors to be accepted as best practice by EMAs and 
hospitals, they must be institutionalized through inclusion in future policy initiatives, laws, 
and accreditation processes, as occurred recently in the “Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act” and recent changes to JCAHO standards.  Further acceptance will 
also occur as evidence-based best management practices are developed and case 
studies are disseminated that encourage and support these behaviors.  (Auf der Heide, 
2006)  It is important that the Federal government base future funding and policy 
initiatives on such evidence-based scientific research instead of anecdotal information.  
A significant national improvement would be a single, standard, web-based information 
management tool that could be used by all EMAs and hospitals across the country to 
improve CIR linkages and response.  However, CIR linkages will only improve if all 
levels of government recognize hospitals as critical infrastructure with special needs and 
ensure they are a key partner for all community emergency planning efforts.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
 
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION, AND RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT LINKAGES AMONG HOSPITALS AND EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT AGENCIES 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
  Considerable resources have been expended over the past few years to 
improve the nation’s capacity to respond to terrorist acts, such as 9/11 or the anthrax 
attacks, and to natural disasters and epidemics, such as Hurricane Katrina, SARS, and 
Avian Influenza.  Emphasis has been primarily on improving the response of traditional 
governmental “first responders”, such as fire, law enforcement, and EMS personnel that 
respond directly to the scene of an incident.  Only recently have hospitals been 
recognized as first responders or “first receivers”, and included in these initiatives. 
(OSHA, 2005). 
 Recent mass casualty events have illustrated that the demand for health care 
can quickly overwhelm the ability of hospitals to respond.  At the same time as 
attempting to handle large influxes of new patients, they must continue to protect and 
treat the patient population already in-house, since hospitals cannot readily be 
evacuated.  Thus, it is crucial that community hospitals be supported by local emergency 
agencies in a disaster and receive special attention during emergency planning efforts.  
Pre-establishing communication, information, and resource management linkages with 
area hospitals benefits the emergency management agency by allowing for the proper 
assignment of the injured to a medical facility to optimize the local medical system and 
by ensuring that local hospitals continue to function. (Auf der Heide, 1989)  “In 
considering the consequences of disasters for communities, hospitals merit special 
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attention thanks to their complexity and occupancy characteristics and thanks to their 
role during disaster situations.” (Arendt and Hess, 2006) 
 One possible reason for the historical lack of focus on hospital preparedness and 
coordination with other local response agencies is that the U.S. has been very fortunate 
in historically experiencing low casualty rates during disasters.  However, the recent 
mass casualty components of 9/11 and then Hurricane Katrina have now brought this 
lack of coordination with hospitals to the forefront. (Wachtendorf, 2002)  The importance 
of linkages among EMAs and hospitals could not have been more fully, and more 
tragically, illustrated than in New Orleans in the days following Hurricane Katrina.  It is 
imperative to learn from these mistakes and affect improvements in our nation’s 
emergency preparedness. (Montgomery, 2005; Davis, 2006; Arendt and Hess, 2006; 
GPO, 2006) 
 Recently in much of the country, state and local EMAs have begun gathering 
information from hospitals, such as bed availability, diversion status, and isolation room 
availability, to determine surge capacity.  However, most EMAs have not yet recognized 
the differing hospital capabilities that could be critical in effective response to a mass 
casualty event, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or 
hazardous materials.  Information about specialties (e.g., burn, infectious diseases) that 
match the way patients are triaged at a scene (e.g., vaccination status of personnel at a 
hospital, pharmaceutical stockpiles, decontamination capabilities, amount of personal 
protective equipment on hand, ability of staff on site to provide decontamination) could 
mean the difference between sending casualties to the right facility and sending them to 
a facility where they will not only be treated ineffectively, but the hospital staff 
themselves would be in peril. 
 A number of electronic information management systems, such as WebEOC, 
Eteam and Reddinet, have been developed to organize this information and assist EMAs 
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with protecting critical community infrastructure during a mass casualty event.  While an 
important step, many of these systems are being used solely by the EMA or only during 
an actual emergency, but not for planning purposes.  There is usually no real-time 
information exchange with medical facilities on their status or needs, nor can the 
hospitals gain access to the information contained in the system.  (EmerGeo, 2006; 
Eteam, 2007; Welsh, 2003; HASC, 2004)  
The many directives and initiatives underway at the federal, state, and local 
levels as well as the applicable body of academic research provide ample evidence of 
the need for improvement in coordination between EMAs and hospitals.  Several studies 
were recently published that attempt to assess communication linkages or information 
management practices in cities across the country.  (Braun et. al., 2006; DHS, 2007). 
For example in 2004, representatives from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) and the George Washington University Institute for 
Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management conducted a nationwide survey of hospital 
integration into community emergency preparedness planning. (Braun et.al, 2006)  A 
questionnaire was sent to a random sample of 1,750 medical-surgical hospitals in the 
U.S. resulting in a 33% response rate.  Hospitals self-reported their prevalence and 
breadth of participation in community-wide planning based on the examination of 17 
basic elements in a weighted analysis.  The assessment found that hospitals self-
reported substantial integration, but that relationships between hospitals and other 
critical response agencies were not sufficiently robust.  Additionally, the Department of 
Homeland Security released in January 2007 its “Tactical Interoperable Communications 
Scorecards” for 75 urban/metropolitan areas in the U.S.; however, it evaluates 
interoperable communications only within governmental agencies, but not with other 
community organizations such as hospitals. (DHS, 2007)   
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While previous studies are important in understanding the current state of CIR 
linkages in communities, they have been limited in that they gathered information from 
either hospitals or emergency response organizations, but not both.  As Yin states, 
“Suppose you want to study a single organization.  However, your research questions 
have to do with the organization’s relationship to other organizations.  Such questions 
can only be answered if you collect information directly from other organizations and not 
merely the one you started with.  If you complete your study by examining only one 
organization, you cannot draw accurate conclusions about inter-organizational 
partnerships”. (Yin, 2003)   
The DHS study focused primarily on gathering information about what physical 
communication processes are in place, not on determining relationship or organizational 
issues.  As evidenced during Hurricane Katrina, having the physical ability to 
communicate does not necessarily mean effective communication will occur; a hospital 
must know who to communicate with and what information to impart.  For example, a 
local hospital in Metairie, Louisiana had cell phone capabilities but did not know initially 
how to call the local or state EMA or Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
in order to alert officials that they had patients that could not be evacuated.  Even when 
the hospital was finally able to contact FEMA, all levels of EMA insisted that the hospital 
was closed and everyone had been evacuated.  By the time the problem was rectified 
and assistance was provided, hospital staff had been on duty for more than a week, 
working around the clock and giving what little food they had on hand to patients to keep 
them alive. A number of larger hospitals in New Orleans experienced similar 
circumstances. (Arendt and Hess, 2006; Maher, 2005; Montgomery, 2005).   
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Study Methodology 
The research described in this paper attempted to gather information from 
multiple sides of the communication paradigm operating in the same city to compare 
responses on management methods as well as perceived strengths and weaknesses.  
The primary study objective was to determine whether improvements are still needed in 
CIR linkages among a community’s EMAs and hospitals, even though massive amounts 
of funding and activity have recently been directed at the problem.  An additional 
objective was to assess whether visual web-based technologies could be one potential 
way to realize these improvements.  To achieve these objectives, a survey was 
developed and administered to EMA and hospital professionals in ten major metropolitan 
areas across the country. 
  Major metropolitan cities were chosen as the unit of analysis for a number of 
reasons.  Most literature sources and major national policy initiatives, such as 
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) and the National Response Plan, 
agree that the first 72 hours of a disaster should be managed at the local level. (O’Leary, 
2004; MMRS, 2004; DHS, 2004)   The majority of medical response will also occur in 
these first few hours, with the possible exception of a bioterrorism or pandemic event.  
(JCAHO, 2003; Duncan, 1995; McHugh et al, 2004; DHS, 2004) 
Major metropolitan cities were also chosen as the unit of analysis because of the 
complexity of organizational relationships present in these locations.  These areas 
typically have both a local EMA as well as a branch of the State EMA, and may possibly 
have a county or regional EMA as well.  The literature has shown that confusion is 
typical as to which agency has governance, or the actual decision-making authority, in 
an event. (Erich, 2003; GPO, 2001; Wright, 1976; DHS, 2007)  Additionally, metropolitan 
areas generally have multiple hospitals of varying sizes and capabilities.  Surveys have 
shown that the level of coordination with local and state EMAs is correlated with the size 
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of the responding hospital.  (GAO, 2003; Braun et. al., 2006)  Thus, it appears relevant 
to include information and opinions from both larger and smaller hospitals within each 
city (as defined by number of beds).  Moreover, larger cities are the focus of this 
research because they: 1) are perceived to be more likely to be a terrorist target, 2) 
would have a larger number of casualties due to population concentration, 3) involve 
multiple hospitals and multiple EMAs so multi-organizational coordination becomes more 
important, and 4) have been the beneficiary of greater funding from the major national 
policy initiatives and grant programs to improve response and coordination.  The 
Department of Homeland Security recognized the importance of “jurisdictions” or cities 
as the central and most important unit for emergency planning in the “Prevention 
Guidelines for Homeland Security”. (DHS, 2003)   
Ten cities were included in this research by dividing the country into five 
geographical regions  and randomly choosing two cities within each geographical region.  
Regional divisions are shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1.  Regional Divisions for Research Study. 
Northeast 
region 
Southeast 
region 
Southcentral 
region 
Northcentral 
region 
West 
region 
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All hospitals within each city were included in the sample population.  The local 
EMA office, any county or regional EMA that could be identified, and the appropriate 
State EMA were also included in the survey.  For security purposes, the participating 
cities are presented in a non-identifying format.    
A separate questionnaire was developed for hospitals and for EMAs, each 
containing mirrored questions to allow for comparison of responses.  Established and 
accepted methodologies and references were used to develop the questionnaires to 
ensure scientific validity and minimize bias.  (Punch, 2003; Thomas, 1999; Dillman, 
2000)  Both questionnaires were piloted by three different groups and revised 
accordingly.  Online survey software was used to program web-based versions of each 
of the paper surveys, developed in accordance with accepted internet survey design 
approaches. (Dillman, 2000)   
The survey instrument was designed to obtain opinions and information 
concerning the organizational behaviors associated with strong CIR linkage planning 
and response.  Accordingly, planning and response indicators and questions were 
developed so the following areas could be assessed: 
– Organizational commitment 
– Communication capabilities and linkages 
– Information management  
– Resource acquisition and allocation strategies  
 
Survey Results 
 Of the 25 surveys distributed to city, metro, county, regional and state-level 
EMAs affiliated with the selected cities, eight emergency management agencies 
responded, representing 7 of the 10 cities and 4 of the 5 regions.  Since the research 
project was designed to assess CIR linkages among EMAs and hospitals by comparing 
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and contrasting responses from both sets of organizations, cities where no responses 
were obtained from EMAs were removed from further consideration.  Thus, surveys 
were sent only to hospitals in seven cities.  This resulted in the distribution of 233 
surveys to hospitals, with 67 being returned, representing a 29% hospital response rate. 
(see Figure 3.2.)  The results of the study were evaluated in a number of ways and are 
presented in the following discussion.   
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Figure 3.2.  Hospital Response Rates by City. 
 
EMA Organizational Representation 
 Although the EMA respondent population size is small (n=8), it is important to 
recognize that this study was not meant to be representative of all EMAs across the 
country, only of those with relationships to the cities of interest.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that of those that responded, four were city or metro-level EMAs, three were 
county/regional-level EMAs and only one was from a state-level EMA.  All but one knew 
there was a group other than their agency that coordinated hospital emergency planning 
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and response in their city.  Also, a majority stated that there was a specific individual 
within their organization responsible for emergency planning or coordination with area 
hospitals, although most of these positions are only part-time. 
  
Hospital Organizational Representation 
The typical measure of the size of a hospital is the number of beds it contains.   
Hospitals in all seven cities had between 12 and 1,435 beds with a mean size of 354 
beds, while the hospitals responding to the survey had bed sizes ranging between 25 
and 1,225 beds and averaged 390 beds.  A between-subjects t-test assuming equal 
variances was performed on hospital data from each city to test statistical difference 
between the means of the bed size data from the sample and the overall hospital 
population in each of the seven cities. (DeCoster, 2006; Moore and McCabe, 2003)  It 
was found that the mean bed size for hospitals responding to the survey was not 
statistically different from the mean bed size of hospitals that were sent questionnaires in 
each city, based on a 95% confidence level and two-tailed test (with t-values ranging 
from 1.96 to 2.23 and p-values ranging from 0.27 to 1.0).  Thus, the hospital responses 
can be considered representative of all hospitals, respectively, in each city. 
 
Survey Results by City 
Survey results for each city are summarized in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.  Table 
3.1 describes the general characteristics of the respondents from each city.  Tables 3.2 
and 3.3 qualitatively assess emergency planning indicators as well as response to a 
mass casualty event or drill in relation to behaviors that result in strong CIR linkages 
among EMAs and hospitals.   The seven participating cities are numbered to prevent 
identification.  Specific findings of interest are discussed following presentation of the 
summary tables. 
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Table 3.1. General Response Characteristics by City. 
 
 
Characteristic of 
Respondents 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
Hospital Response Rate 
 
 
25% 
 
18% 
 
19% 
 
100% 
 
50% 
 
19% 
 
67% 
 
% of available beds represented 
 
 
32% 
 
28% 
 
15% 
 
100% 
 
42% 
 
28% 
 
78% 
 
Average bed size range 
 
 
501-750 
 
 
251-500 
 
 
251-500 
 
 
251-500 
 
 
101-250 
 
 
251-500 
 
 
251-500 
 
% of respondents who are 
Trauma Centers 
 
 
75% 
 
75% 
 
30% 
 
27% 
 
28% 
 
46% 
 
70% 
 
% of respondents who are 
JCAHO-accredited 
 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
100% 
 
86% 
 
100% 
 
90% 
 
Does EMA have a hospital 
coordinator? 
 
 
Full-time 
 
Full-time 
 
No response 
 
Part-time 
 
Part-time 
 
Part-time 
 
 
None 
 
Do hospitals have emergency 
planners? 
 
 
50% PT 
25% FT 
25% None 
 
75% PT 
12.5% FT 
12.5% None 
 
66% PT 
33% FT 
 
45% PT 
27% FT 
27% None 
 
57% PT 
29% FT 
14% None 
 
55% PT 
45% FT 
 
90% PT 
10% FT 
 
FT = full-time; PT = part-time 
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Table 3.2. Emergency Planning Indicators by City. 
 
Emergency Planning 
Indicators 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Third-party organization 
coordinating hospital response 
other than EMA 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Written plans organized by 
capabilities needed to respond to 
mass casualty events 
 
Poor 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
Written plans address: 
- communications 
- information management 
- resource management 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Written plans/vendor agreements 
address competition for resources 
by hospitals 
 
Poor 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
Written plans incorporate Incident 
Command System (ICS) 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Level of plan coordination with 
- EMA 
- other area hospitals 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Fair 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
Excellent 
Fair 
 
Good 
Fair 
 
Excellent 
Good 
Routine interactions with 
- EMA 
- other area hospitals 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
Degree of hospital involvement in 
LEPC 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
 
Good 
 
Good 
 
Excellent 
Frequency of routine status update 
exchanges with 
- EMA 
- other area hospitals 
 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
 
 
Excellent 
Fair 
 
 
Good 
Fair 
 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
 
Excellent 
Good 
 
 
Excellent 
Excellent 
EMA and hospital agreement on 
community hazards and risks 
 
Excellent 
 
Poor 
 
Good 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Fair 
 
Poor 
Hospital use of geographical 
information systems (GIS) 
 
Good 
 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Excellent = 75% - 100% of hospitals responded positively to indicator  Fair = 25% - 50% of hospitals responded positively to indicator 
Good = 50% - 75% of hospitals responded positively to indicator  Poor = 0% - 25% of hospitals responded positively to indicator 
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Table 3.3. Emergency Response Indicators by City. 
 
Emergency Response 
Indicators 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
Timeliness and accuracy of 
information provided by EMA 
about event 
 
Poor 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
 
Good 
Frequency of status update 
exchanges with 
- EMA 
- other area hospitals 
 
 
Poor 
Poor 
 
 
Good 
Fair 
 
 
Fair 
Fair 
 
 
Good 
Good 
 
 
Excellent 
Fair 
 
 
Excellent 
Fair 
 
 
Good 
Good 
Use of hospital status updates 
to route casualties during event 
 
Poor 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Good 
 
Good 
Degree of inter-hospital 
communication and 
coordination during event 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
 
Fair 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
 
Good 
 
Good 
Adequacy of resource 
acquisition and management 
during event 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Poor 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
 
Good 
Adequacy of written plan and 
staff training 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Fair 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
 
Excellent 
Adequacy of decontamination 
capabilities 
 
Excellent 
 
Excellent 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Good 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
Use of information management 
systems 
 
Good 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
Interoperability of 
communication systems used 
during event 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Good 
 
Good 
Breadth of information 
exchanged about hospital 
status during event 
 
Fair 
 
Good 
 
Good 
 
Fair 
 
Fair 
 
Excellent 
 
Good 
Highest priority for improvement 
in response coordination among 
EMA and hospitals 
 
Info accuracy 
Casualty 
routing 
 
Communication
 
Interoperable 
Information 
Management 
 
Mass 
Decon 
Abilities 
 
Hospital 
Interoperability
 
Communication
 
Communication
 
Excellent = 75% - 100% of hospitals responded positively to indicator  Fair = 25% - 50% of hospitals responded positively to indicator 
Good = 50% - 75% of hospitals responded positively to indicator  Poor = 0% - 25% of hospitals responded positively to indicator 
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Overall institutional commitment indicators among hospitals were strong, with 
89% of respondents stating that there was a specific individual within their organization 
responsible for emergency planning.  Of hospitals with an identified emergency 
coordinator, 70% of these individuals were part-time, with the remainder being full-time 
emergency coordinators.  All responding hospitals had a written mass casualty response 
plan that incorporated the Incident Command System.  The majority of respondents 
stated that their plan addressed CIR linkages and had been coordinated with their local 
EMA.   
Most hospitals reported participating in their Local Emergency Planning 
Committee (LEPC), and 90% participated in community emergency planning groups 
other than the LEPC.  98% periodically conduct drills to test preparedness for mass 
casualty events.  Dedicating staff time to focus on emergency planning, write plans, and 
participate in community planning groups as well as resource expenditures to conduct 
drills are all indicators of an institutional commitment to mass casualty preparedness and 
effective response. 
As shown in the tables, hospitals responded more negatively to indicators 
concerning actual community response to a mass casualty event or drill.  Most hospitals 
felt they had adequate resources to respond to the event, their written plan was 
sufficient, and hospital staff were well-trained.  However, a number of hospitals did not 
believe they received accurate, timely or sufficient information from the EMA during 
event response.  The degree of inter-hospital communication and coordination was 
consistently rated only fair to good, and the majority of hospitals stated that any status 
updates they did provide were not used to improve casualty routing during the event.  
The majority of hospitals expressed that they had the same priority concern, which was 
to improve communications. 
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City 5 was recognized as an exemplary practice by displaying positive 
relationships and linkages among the various emergency management agencies in the 
city as well as by the high level of coordination evident in responses by the city’s 
hospitals to indicators concerning actual emergency response.  Of the seven cities 
included in the study, the City 5 hospital community was the only one that challenged the 
author’s identity due to security concerns.  This led to a lengthy personal 
correspondence with both the city and county EMA representatives as well as several of 
the hospital representatives.  From this and the survey results, it was clear that the 
hospitals and both levels of EMAs have an active working relationship. Additionally, a 
close working relationship exists between these two local EMAs.  The City 5 EMAs have 
long-recognized and acted upon a number of the strengths in emergency planning and 
have implemented two types of unique EMA linkage-building organizations that have 
been recognized throughout the country as a best practice. (DeYoung, 2006; NGA, 
2005; FNS, 2006)   City 5 was further developed into a case study that is discussed in a 
subsequent chapter. 
A number of cities had conflicts between the EMA responses and the hospitals 
responses which were not captured in the summary tables presented.  Even though the 
hospitals in several cities responded positively that they had received accurate and 
timely information from the EMA, the EMA disagreed that they had received accurate 
and timely status updates from the hospitals, although such information had been 
requested.    Additionally, the EMAs and hospitals tended to have conflicts in identified 
hazard prevalence within the community, communication methods used during event 
response, and use of GIS.  
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Hazard Evaluation Results 
 The survey asked respondents to identify what natural and manmade hazards 
were perceived to imperil their community.  While it has been shown that planning for 
response capabilities that could be used in any response to any hazard is the most 
effective for successful emergency response, this question was included to determine 
whether EMAs and hospitals had worked together in analyzing their community’s hazard 
vulnerabilities.  Additionally, a hazard vulnerability analysis is important to ensure that an 
organization’s planning efforts will be sufficient to respond to any known natural or man-
made hazards and corresponding issues.  For example, a community could do an 
outstanding job of planning for response capabilities in all-hazard planning.  However, 
because they would need specialized equipment, training, and knowledge to properly 
respond to a radioactive materials release from a nearby nuclear power plant, the 
community’s response organizations would need to specifically plan for this response in 
addition to all-hazard planning efforts. 
 As reported in the city summaries, there were a number of communities wherein 
the indicated hazards were highly variable throughout EMA and hospital responses.  
This indicates both a lack of coordination in planning among organizations in a 
community, as well as insufficient planning if all organizations in a community have not 
planned to respond to similar sets of hazards.  As an example of this variability, the 
results from surveys returned by the EMA and hospitals in City 7 are shown in Table 3.4.   
Areas of inconsistency are highlighted in red showing the disagreement prevalent in this 
community.  The lack of consistency in recognizing potential hazardous materials events 
is of particular concern. 
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Table 3.4.  Most Prevalent Natural Hazards, Manmade Hazards, Threats, or Terrorist 
Targets as Reported by City #7 Respondents. 
 
Hazards Reported Consistently 
by City 7 Respondents 
Hazards Reported Inconsistently
By City 7 Respondents 
Natural Hazards Natural Hazards 
Earthquakes Winter Storms 
 Other 
 Floods 
 Landslides 
 Tsunamis 
 Hurricanes 
 Tornadoes 
 Wildfires 
 Extreme Heat 
Manmade Hazard/Threat/Target 
 
Manmade Hazard/Threat/Target 
Seaports Nuclear Power Plants 
Ferries Dams 
Large Sporting Events/Venues Power Plants 
Large College or University Potential for other terrorist activities 
Bridges Other 
Waterways Potential for radioactive releases 
Water Treatment Plants Chemical Manufacturing Plants 
Military Installations Chemical Storage Facilities 
Commuter Trains/Train Stations Potential for chemical releases 
 Potential for biological releases 
 National Defense Laboratory 
 Subways 
 
 
  
Communication Methods and Information Transfer during Mass Casualty Events or Drills 
 The questionnaire assessed the most prevalent methods used by EMAs and 
hospitals to communicate with each other during mass casualty events and drills as well 
as the types of information that were transmitted during these communications.  To 
improve CIR linkages among EMAs and hospitals, it is important to understand “how” 
they are currently talking to each other and “what” they are telling each other during 
current event response.  Interoperable communication methods are needed so that the 
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organizations can physically talk to each other, but that alone is not sufficient.  Strong 
response will only occur if the information being transmitted is timely, accurate, and of 
sufficient quality. 
All EMAs stated that they communicated with area hospitals during their last 
event or drill, while 84% of hospitals reported communicating with either their local EMA 
or other local hospitals.  The most prevalent communication methods used are 
presented in Figure 3.3. 
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Other
Web or internet-based information mgt system
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Web or internet-based system
Cellular phones
Land phones
Respondents who answered affirmatively, %
 
Figure 3.3. Inter-organizational Communication Methods. 
 
 Figure 3.4 illustrates the type of information currently being transmitted from the 
hospital to the EMA during a response to a mass casualty event or drill.  Since the 
amount of information needing to be transmitted grows as an event evolves, the use of 
information systems (such as GIS) increases in importance, as to enable larger 
quantities of information to be transmitted quickly and accurately.  It would be difficult 
during a mass casualty event to provide such information on a hospital’s status via 
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phone, which is the most popular means of communication currently being used.  It 
would be even more difficult for an EMA to quickly and accurately manage the amount of 
information pouring in by phone from dozens of hospitals without being quickly 
overwhelmed.  Thus, electronic information management systems become crucial to a 
strong community response. 
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Figure 3.4. Types of Information Provided by Hospitals to the Local EMA or Other Area 
Hospitals. 
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Information Technology and GIS Usage 
 The survey also included questions to ascertain the current level of usage of 
electronic communication and information management systems, particularly GIS, in 
emergency planning and response by both EMAs and hospitals.  All responding EMAs 
were already using GIS for at least one application, with GIS being used for hazardous 
materials release plume modeling, damage assessment, evacuation modeling, and flood 
mapping.  Less than half of the EMAs reported using GIS with applications specific to 
hospitals, including hazard vulnerability analyses and capacity planning for hospital staff 
and equipment. 
 Unfortunately, the vast majority of hospitals were either not using GIS (70%) or 
did not know whether they were using GIS (20%).  Thus, the majority of hospitals would 
need to purchase a GIS platform and then be trained in its use for this information 
technology to become a viable communication option and information management 
system for both EMAs and hospitals.  On a positive note, a number of EMAs and 
hospitals reported using web-based information systems such as WebEOC, ETeam or 
ReddiNet from third-party vendors.  A visual GIS component targeting hospitals and 
supporting suppliers would significantly enhance these systems, and overall CIR 
linkages, with minimal additional cost and training. 
 
Study Conclusions 
 Survey findings support the conclusion that improvements are still needed in CIR 
linkages among a community’s EMAs and hospitals, even though massive amounts of 
funding and activity have been directed at the problem, particularly since the events of 
September 11, 2001.  While the need for improvement remains, it is noteworthy that 
significant progress has been made.  The findings also support the conclusion that the 
most viable way to realize these improvements is through enhanced organizational 
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management strategies.  The use of web-based information technologies, particularly 
applications that leverage GIS, represents a promising way to improve the tools needed 
to support decision-making by those managing mass casualty events.   
 A number of strengths and weaknesses in both mass casualty planning and 
actual response within these seven cities were also identified.  Since these were 
common themes throughout all seven city responses, they likely represent the typical 
strengths and weaknesses present in planning and response in most metropolitan U.S. 
cities throughout the country.   
 
SIGNIFICANT STRENGTHS: 
9 Planning indicators are generally much stronger and better developed than 
actual response indicators.  Since most cities conduct more drills than actual 
responses to mass casualty events, this is expected. 
9 Hospitals are demonstrating institutional commitment to emergency response 
planning; nearly all had a specific individual responsible for emergency 
preparedness.  However, most of these individuals have this as a part-time duty. 
9 EMAs now recognize the importance of hospitals as critical infrastructure in 
community emergency response and have committed to collaborative planning 
efforts, with most having a specific individual designated with this responsibility. 
9 Hospitals are having many formal and informal relationship and linkage-building 
opportunities with their local EMAs, resulting in high routine interaction levels. 
9 The Incident Command System is being used throughout EMAs and hospitals for 
emergency response.  Thus, all responding agencies are using the same 
management system and terminology during response, which should reduce 
confusion and miscommunication. 
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9 Most hospitals have organized their mass casualty response plans by response 
capabilities, which is a more effective strategy than planning by event type. 
9 The majority of hospitals and EMAs reported having agreements with vendors 
already in place to obtain additional supplies during a mass casualty event. 
9 Electronic communication systems are currently being used by both EMAs and 
hospitals during emergency response.  
9 All cities reported significant drill activity, averaging one per year since 9/11. 
9 The majority of hospitals reported communicating with the local EMA during their 
last event or drill. 
9 Nearly all hospitals reported that their personnel were sufficiently trained to be 
able to follow written emergency plans. 
 
SIGNIFICANT WEAKNESSES: 
¾ Hospitals and EMAs have not coordinated their hazard vulnerability analyses to 
focus planning efforts and to ensure that all known hazards and threats are 
accommodated. 
¾ Mass decontamination abilities have not been fully developed in all hospitals. 
¾ Hospitals and EMAs have not fully developed interoperable communication 
and/or information management systems.  EMAs are using mostly one-to-one 
communication methods, such as phones and radios during an actual event.  
Hospitals reported using computer-based information technology during actual 
response much more frequently than EMAs. 
¾ Resource acquisition and management is not being fully addressed and could 
potentially cause a critical failure of the entire response system.  The competition 
between hospitals for resources during an actual event has been virtually ignored 
throughout all cities. 
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¾ When hospitals did provide status reports during response, this information was 
not used to route casualties to or away from their hospital.  Casualty routing 
appears to be disconnected with information about a hospital’s status. 
¾ While hospital/EMA linkages have improved since 9/11, inter-hospital linkages 
are still weak and could improve so hospitals are not entirely dependent on their 
local EMA for information and assistance.   
¾ Open-ended responses overwhelmingly indicated that “communication” should 
be the highest priority for improvement in response coordination between EMAs 
and community hospitals. 
¾ Open-ended responses from every city indicated that city/state health 
departments or third-party hospital associations are the primary emergency 
planning linkage for hospitals. EMA/hospital planning linkages are possibly 
secondary to those established with health departments.  Since the primary 
response agency to any mass casualty event will be the local EMA, it is uncertain 
whether these health planning linkages will result in strong community response 
to an event. 
From the information gathered during the study, a diagram depicting the quality of 
current CIR linkages among EMAs and hospitals in a metropolitan city is provided in 
Figure 3.5.  As shown, general CIR linkages between a community’s EMA and its 
hospitals have strengthened since 9/11, with some specific areas of improvement still 
needed, such as interoperable communications and resource management.  Each 
hospital appears to be coordinating more effectively with its area EMA and the third-
party coordinating organization than it is with other area hospitals; thus, CIR linkages 
among the hospitals themselves appear to need significant improvement.  Local EMAs 
reported weaker linkages with State EMAs than with area hospitals, and hospitals 
appeared to have very weak or non-existent linkages with State-level EMAs.  Hospitals 
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reported strong linkages with third-party coordinating agencies, but the linkages among 
these agencies and EMAs were not assessed in this study. 
 
 
Figure 3.5.  Current State of CIR Linkages among EMAs and Hospitals. 
 
Directions for Future Improvements  
 The findings from this study provide a path forward for future improvements in 
CIR linkages.   The primary recommendation that will strengthen inter-hospital and inter-
EMA CIR linkages is to improve organizational management strategies that force routine 
pre-event interactions,, relationship-building and planning coordination opportunities 
within the EMA and hospital communities, as well as other emergency response 
organizations.  These strategies will encourage cooperation, trust, communication, 
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information sharing, coordination, and team-building both during pre-event planning and 
during event response.  Specific improvement strategies that have been shown to be 
successful are planning committees, routine status update exchanges, plan 
coordination, and drill participation.  The strategies that work may be unique to each 
community.  
No tool will improve CIR linkages if core organizational management strategies 
are not sufficiently vigorous.  However, the study also found that more robust and 
innovative systems for communication and information management should be created 
to support decision-making during a mass casualty event.  These systems should allow 
all stakeholders to gather, disseminate, and view event information and status reports in 
real-time.  While WebEOC, Eteam, and Reddinet are substantial improvements over 
what existed a few years ago, these systems need to become more robust, be able to 
handle more types of hospital status parameters, have additional visual and geographic 
components, and be adopted on a widespread basis by both the EMA and hospital 
sectors.  The visual components are especially important in light of previous research 
findings that information systems with capabilities to visually project information allowed 
emergency managers to make quicker and better-informed decisions. 
 More robust information management systems would also improve resource 
management capabilities for the community as a whole, reduce the competition for 
resources by hospitals during events, allow for more fully developed casualty routing 
methods, and decrease the information overload suffered by all responders during a 
mass casualty event.  By web-enabling these systems and allowing access by all 
stakeholders, communication and information quality would be substantially improved 
through increased accuracy and timeliness of information transfer.  These systems can 
be supported during emergencies as most Emergency Operations Centers in EMAs and 
hospitals have back-up electricity generators to offset power outages.  Thus, visual web-
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based information technologies offer the most robust answer to the “interoperability” and 
“information overload” conundrums.    
 A successful emergency management information system should contain 
appropriate information attributes as well as provide interconnectivity between the 
various parties so that the right information is getting to the right place at the right time.  
One potential approach to achieve this objective is the system conceptualized in Figure 
3.6, a GIS-based approach designed to improve these weak CIR linkages among EMAs 
and hospitals.   
 The system would allow for all levels of EMAs as well as all area hospitals to be 
connected and have access to the same information about an incident.  Involved EMAs 
would provide routine site updates about the event, including estimated casualties, type 
of injuries to expect, potential involvement of hazardous materials, criminal status, and 
other information about the status of the surrounding community.  The hospitals would 
provide routine information updates concerning the casualties they are receiving, any 
damage to the hospital, how many more casualties the hospital could handle, ongoing 
resource status, etc.  Additionally, all entities would have access to pre-created and pre-
planned data layers containing information that the EMAs or hospitals might need to 
obtain additional or specialized resources, vendors, or assistance.  
Opportunities for further system development include optimizing and expanding 
this design and implementation of a pilot project in a city wherein EMAs and hospitals 
are already using GIS for other applications.  
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Figure 3.6.  Conceptualization of GIS Design to Improve Weak CIR Linkages. 
 
 The features of best practice CIR linkages in a community have been 
transformed into a 10-point evaluation/audit tool, as shown in Table 3.5.  This tool could 
be used to provide a qualitative assessment and gap analysis of the performance level 
of CIR linkages among EMAs and hospitals within a community.   Each factor in this 
template is a measurable performance indicator of strong community CIR linkages that 
are likely to result in improved response to mass casualty events.  Each performance 
measure should be scored as “Non-existent”, “Needs Improvement”, “Satisfactory” or 
“Exemplary”.  
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Table 3.5.  Community CIR Linkage Scorecard. 
 
  Performance Indicator 
1. 
Institutional commitment by key response organizations demonstrated by 
dedication of staff to focused emergency planning and coordination among 
EMA and hospital communities. 
2. Formalized committees or other interaction mechanisms between EMA staff and staff from all hospitals in community.  
3. 
Informal interaction opportunities: 
    - within EMA community 
    - between EMA and hospital community 
    - within hospital community 
4. Pre-event status of interpersonal relationships among all key stakeholders in EMAs and hospitals. 
5. Development of community hazard vulnerability analysis and use by all key stakeholders in planning. 
6. Development of redundant, interoperable communication methods connecting all key EMA and hospital stakeholders. 
7. 
Development of large-scale information management and decision 
documentation mechanisms that are interconnected among all key EMA and 
hospital stakeholders. 
8. 
Community-wide planning effort for hospital resource support during mass 
casualty event, including pre-event planning for competition for resources by 
hospitals. 
9. Capability of all hospitals in community to decontaminate mass volumes of patients for hazardous materials contamination. 
10. Routine community-wide drills or practice mechanisms for multi-hospital response to mass casualty events. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
 
PHOENIX, ARIZONA: THE GOLD STANDARD OF  
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LINKAGES  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2006, a research study was conducted that assessed communication, 
information, and resource management (CIR) linkages among emergency management 
agencies (EMA) and hospitals during mass casualty event response in seven major U.S. 
cities.  This study evaluated whether any improvements had occurred in emergency 
management planning and response since the events of 9/11/01, particularly relating to 
hospital coordination and support during mass casualty events.  An additional goal was 
to develop a best management practice case study focusing on a single city, recognizing 
that this approach considered accepted methodology in disaster research. (Valelly, 
2004; Auf der Heide, 2006)   Of the cities under consideration, Phoenix emerged as 
having exemplary communication, information, and resource management linkages, 
particularly among various levels of emergency management agencies.  For this reason, 
it was selected for case study development. 
Phoenix, as shown in Figure 4.1., is the country’s fifth-largest city (with nearly 
four million residents in the metropolitan area), contains the world’s sixth-busiest airport, 
is within fifty miles of the country’s largest nuclear power plant, is one of the country’s 
top tourist destinations, is a neighbor to the Luke Air Force Base, and is located within 
two hundred miles of the U.S./Mexico border. (AP, 2006b)  These characteristics make it 
imperative that Phoenix have well-organized and fully-developed capabilities to respond 
to a potential mass casualty event.  Additionally, Arizona has, unfortunately, had intimate 
connections to the two worst terrorist events on American soil, as both Timothy McVeigh 
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and several of the 9/11 terrorists lived in the state.  While no area in Arizona was 
believed to be a target of these individuals, it showcases that terrorist activities are 
present.  (Hensley, 2005; AP, 2006a)  Recognizing these circumstances, Governor 
Janet Napolitano developed the first statewide homeland security strategy, one that: 1) 
identified priority projects which would protect first responders, 2) improved security of 
critical infrastructure such as hospitals, and 3) enhanced communications systems and 
overall detection/response capabilities.  (Napolitano, 2003)  One of these priority 
projects was the development of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
(ACTIC) in 2004, which is discussed in detail later.    
 
 
Figure 4.1. Phoenix, Arizona. 
 
Phoenix emerged as a best practice by exhibiting positive relationships and 
linkages among the various emergency management agencies in the city, as well as a 
high level of coordination with and between the city’s hospitals.  From lengthy personal 
correspondence with both the Phoenix and Maricopa County EMA representatives as 
well as several of the hospital representatives, in addition to survey responses, it 
became clear that the hospitals and the EMAs have an active working relationship, as do 
the EMAs with one another.  Moreover, the Phoenix, Maricopa County, and State of 
Arizona EMAs have long-recognized and acted upon a number of proactive emergency 
 80 
 
planning methods, resulting in the implementation of two types of unique EMA linkage-
building organizations that have been recognized throughout the country as a best 
practice. (DeYoung, 2006; NGA, 2005; FNS, 2006).  The following discussion provides 
more details on these initiatives. 
 
Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau 
The Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau (HDB) was launched in late 2002 in 
order to improve and formalize operational relationships among Phoenix’s Fire, Police, 
Public Health, and Emergency Management departments.  The HDB was created to 
develop teams of public safety experts who could jointly assess vulnerabilities or 
situations so that incidents could be resolved more quickly and safely. (Kahn, 2006)  
While the name suggests a sophisticated center laden with the latest high-technology 
gadgets, the HDB is more about a concept than a physical location or equipment.  HDB 
focuses on relationship and linkage building.   
The HDB is a coalition of at least one high-ranking official from each of the 
aforementioned local emergency response agencies, who have physically co-located 
their offices into one open setting.  Each representative remains a part of his/her home 
organization and acts as a liaison between the Bureau and their home organization.   
While the relationship between these agencies has historically been positive, they were 
confined to the street level – “interaction at emergency scenes and the occasional drop 
by visit for coffee”. (Khan, 2006)  The HDB extends this interaction into the highest level 
of administration of these public agencies.  Through the Bureau, assistant chiefs and 
police commanders are able to have daily interactions, quickly discuss situations and 
ideas to brainstorm solutions, and understand their partner organizations more 
thoroughly.  This “culture shift” has occurred with a minimal economic outlay and has 
been seen as an extremely positive improvement by all organizations involved. (Villa, 
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2003; Khan, 2006)  A financial investment was made to improve communications among 
these departments by creating interoperable systems that all could use.  These 
interoperable systems were recently highlighted by the Department of Homeland 
Security in the “Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards” report. (DHS, 2007) 
Positive relationships among these organizations were clearly evident during the 
site visit.  In many cities, these organizations are antagonistic and turf wars prevail, 
primarily because the police, fire, and emergency management agencies compete for 
funding and primacy in their locality.  However, this conflict was not apparent in Phoenix.  
Considerable informal, positive interaction was observed occurring among all levels of 
staff at the Bureau.  For example, police representatives were very complimentary of 
their partners in the fire department and emergency management agency.  Inter-agency 
staff eat lunch together while discussing various programs and incidents.  These 
informal interactions and relationships have been shown to be a significant strength in 
emergency planning and response because communication is more frequent, 
information is disseminated more quickly, and decisions are made more rapidly with 
greater input.   
While primary linkages are between the HDB and the city’s traditional emergency 
response organizations, secondary linkages also extend to other community programs 
and organizations with an important role in emergency planning and response.  These 
linkages are shown in Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2. Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau Linkages. 
 
It should be noted that the city has developed an all-hazards response plan that 
is compliant with the new requirements of the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS).  Additionally, the Bureau practices a true unified command, with the police and 
fire departments responding jointly to all incidents, yet agreeing on the designation of 
one on-scene incident commander directing both police and fire department activities.  
With the city’s Emergency Operations Center located upstairs from the HDB, there is 
also a strong linkage between the Bureau and the EOC, enabling information to flow 
freely during an incident. 
 
Hospital Coordination and Support 
A review of aggregate survey responses for all cities indicated strong linkages 
between the local EMA and area hospitals, with weaker linkages evident within the 
hospital community itself.  In Phoenix, efforts are being made to address this problem. 
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A hospital preparedness committee was formed by HDB several years ago so 
that a closer working relationship could be developed with area hospitals towards 
improving medical response to a mass casualty event.  With the HDB representative 
being a registered nurse with over 20 years experience in various hospital settings, 
working closely with hospitals became a natural extension for the agency. 
The productive work of this committee was evident both in survey responses and 
the site visit.  Phoenix has two major healthcare systems, Banner and Abrazo.  
Representatives from the Abrazo indicated a very proactive approach to response 
planning.  Banner is in the process of creating a unique, system-wide hospital 
Emergency Operations Center that would coordinate response among Banner hospitals 
and liaison with the city’s EOC.  If the Banner system-wide EOC proves useful in 
upcoming drills, the city is considering creating an all-hospital EOC that would 
coordinate and support all area hospitals during city-wide incidents. 
Phoenix officials have also developed a strategic communication plan that 
includes broad representation from various public support disciplines, including thirty-six 
area hospitals. (DHS, 2007)  This strategy supports the prioritization of communication 
goals so that funding can be planned accordingly.  
Another innovative program implemented by HDB to support area hospitals is the 
development of medical Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).  CERTs 
are comprised of community volunteers, often people who have some medical expertise 
such as EMTs, pharmacists, or retired physicians and nurses, and are an attempt to pre-
organize and effectively use those volunteers in disaster situations.  CERT volunteers 
commit to a significant amount of training, including Incident Command System and 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) response training,  
as well as participating in city-wide emergency drills.  The CERTs are deployed to local 
hospitals to improve surge capacity during a mass casualty event.  The Hospital 
 84 
 
Preparedness Committee has designed the program with the teams being managed by 
the city’s Public Health Manager and the volunteers being trained by area hospitals.  
Although credentialing is a problem, it is being addressed as the program evolves.   The 
goal is to have each CERT deployed with a ham radio and trained operator, as well as 
their own supply cache designed to last at least 72 hours.  The ultimate goal of the 
program is to recruit eight hundred CERT volunteers into various specialty teams. 
The City of Phoenix has been innovative in improving its emergency response 
capabilities by embracing low-cost, non-traditional ideas such as the Homeland Defense 
Bureau and the development of the CERT program.  These government initiatives, 
coupled with the innovation of the hospital community in creating the hospital 
preparedness committee, system-wide EOCs, and possibly all-hospital EOCs, have 
made Phoenix a study in best practices that any city could adopt.    Primary and 
secondary linkages among the hospital community and EMAs in Phoenix are depicted in 
Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.3. Phoenix Medical Community Emergency Planning Linkages. 
 
Maricopa County Department of Emergency Management 
 The Maricopa County Department of Emergency Management (DEM) 
encompasses the City of Phoenix as well as a large area that has sparse populations 
outside the metropolitan region.  It also includes an Indian reservation and the largest 
nuclear power plant in the country.  Since Phoenix has such well-developed emergency 
management capabilities and its own EOC, Maricopa County DEM tends to focus on 
county incidents, such as flooding, and issues relating to the nuclear power plant.   
 It was observed that the Operations Manager of the Maricopa County DEM had a 
long-established and productive relationship with the Phoenix Homeland Defense 
Bureau.    These two organizations were extremely knowledgeable and respectful of the 
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programs and actions of each other.  Positive and productive linkages were well-
developed and apparent. 
The Maricopa County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is technologically 
well-equipped, employing a web-based EOC management program and various 
geographical information system (GIS) applications.  Maricopa County employs a full-
time GIS specialist who has created mapping interfaces that are used by the EOC, such 
as a spatial database detailing the locations of all persons with special needs in the 
county.  The County EOC uses the web software to manage information received from 
area hospitals and has the capabilities to receive daily, routine status reports.  Clearly, 
access to this information is dependent on each hospital entering the daily updated 
information.   
Maricopa County DEM spearheads the county Local Emergency Planning 
Committee (LEPC), which encompasses the City of Phoenix, and has many participating 
hospitals.  Although Maricopa County DEC appears to be a more traditional organization 
than the City of Phoenix, it has been open to and engaged in the city’s innovative 
programs. 
The State of Arizona’s Emergency Operations Center is located at the same 
military installation as the Maricopa County DEM office and EOC.  The State’s EOC 
appeared typical, with phones and computer stations for all of the various state 
agencies, as well as a “Mass Care representative” and a “Medical Branch 
representative”.   
The State EMA appeared disconnected from both the Maricopa County DEM and 
the Phoenix HDB.  State emergency management representatives did not know the city 
or county level emergency managers, and refused to share any after-action reports or 
performance information from recent drills with the author.  These actions seemed to 
indicate a disconnect of linkages between the State EMA and the local EMAs.  This is 
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disturbing, given that Arizona state leaders clearly recognized the importance of these 
linkages when creating of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC). 
 
Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) 
 The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) was opened in 
October 2004 as one of the cornerstones of Governor Napolitano’s homeland security 
strategy.  This intelligence “fusion center” houses more than 200 representatives from 34 
local, state and federal agencies, acting as the state’s central analysis hub for crime and 
terrorism-related intelligence. (DeFalco, 2004; Hensley, 2005; FNS, 2006)  At the state 
level, intelligence fusion centers provide an opportunity to break down intelligence silos 
and transcend traditional bureaucratic turf wars. (NGA, 2005)  At the time it was created, 
the ACTIC was considered state-of-the-art and unlike any other center in America.  Now, 
there are 42 such fusion centers in operation with more being introduced.  However, the 
Arizona center is still considered one of the best-operated and most effective. (DeYoung, 
2006; NGA, 2005)    
The ACTIC was the brainchild of the former assistant director of Arizona’s 
Department of Public Safety and the former head of the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task 
Force, who designed the center together on a napkin one morning over breakfast in 
2002.  The pair approached Arizona’s political leadership, who supported the idea and 
secured a federal Department of Homeland Security grant to pay for the $5.3 million 
complex. (Hensley, 2005; DeFalco, 2004; DeYoung, 2006)  In June 2003, the DHS 
Office of Domestic Preparedness issued the “Prevention Guidelines for Homeland 
Security”, which encouraged the development of these fusion centers across the 
country.  (DHS, 2003)   Although the original purpose of ACTIC was counterterrorism 
work, it is now an all-hazards center. 
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 Based on a site visit to the ACTIC, the entire structure and concept can be 
summed up in a word, “relationships”.  ACTIC is all about building linkages and 
relationships among various levels and jurisdictions of emergency response agencies.  
 ACTIC is housed in a plain, unidentified facility. The center is completely self-
supporting, with generators, food stores and water filtration systems to keep the staff 
safe.  The center was originally designed to be kept completely secret, but the State 
later recognized that public input was needed for the center to be successful, and 
subsequently created a public outreach and education arm.   
The ACTIC director and department heads’ salaries are funded by the Arizona 
Department of Public Safety (AZDPS), with the remaining 200-member staff being 
supported by their home agencies, such as city-level police and fire departments.  All 
staff serve voluntarily, but at the request of AZDPS, and their home agencies have 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding to devote personnel full-time to the goals and 
activities of the ACTIC. 
The core of ACTIC is one large office area filled with cubicles in the interior and 
hard-side offices around the edge.  These represent the offices of representatives from 
police, fire, and emergency management agencies from across Arizona.  Officers from 
agencies in the same geographical area are separated in the ACTIC office space (e.g., 
the police representative and fire department representative from Tucson are seated 
apart from each other).  This seating structure is meant to encourage relationships 
among staff from various agencies and across geographical regions.  Representatives 
work on cases from their home areas as well as on more general state-wide situations.  
These relationships are meant to foster communication and information management 
linkages among disparate agencies and personnel.  The benefit of this approach is that 
people with differing technical expertise and regional experience may view evidence 
from the same case differently or might draw parallels to cases in their own areas, 
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particularly since criminals are not considerate enough to only break the law in one 
place.  Thus, these emergency response and law enforcement agents are mixed and 
mingled purposely.  
Across the hall from the Arizona contingent is the Federal agency area.  The FBI 
is the primary federal stakeholder although dozens of other agencies are also 
represented, from the CIA to the U.S. Forestry Service.  These federal agents have 
offices located in a separate area of the building because of the differences in security 
clearances.  Even so, they are within close proximity and join the Arizona agents in the 
joint Emergency Operations Center during a major event, as well as during everyday 
interactions, such as for meetings and lunch.  Primary and secondary relationships of 
the ACTIC with other emergency response organizations and programs are shown in 
Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4. ACTIC Linkages. 
 
The ACTIC is supported by state-of-the-art technology and clearly recognizes the 
importance of the use of geographic information systems.  Not only does the ACTIC 
have access to the information in over ninety-one databases, it also has a large, 
dedicated GIS staff.  These experts are capable of instantly creating GIS applications as 
different ACTIC needs arise.   
The ACTIC EOC uses web-based software modified with in-house GIS programs 
as its overall information management system.  The EOC has video projection wall 
capable of projecting numerous video streams of information at one time, such as a GIS 
map of infrastructure, news reports, etc.  The ACTIC EOC also gathers critical 
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infrastructure information during events, such as hospital facility damage reports and 
hospital resource capabilities. 
 
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) Training Program 
 Since every emergency response agency in Arizona cannot dedicate a full-time 
staff member to ACTIC, an outreach training program was created by ACTIC to establish 
linkages with agencies outside its umbrella.  Staff from any agency, even outside of 
Arizona, can attend TLO training to become familiar with hazard analysis, risk 
assessment, terrorism identification and response, counterterrorism measures, response 
to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) events, and other 
subjects.   
 After training, the TLO returns to their home organization, but acts as an ongoing 
liaison with ACTIC.  The TLO also conducts a threat vulnerability analysis for their 
geographical area and funnels that information back to ACTIC to more fully develop the 
centralized information system.  The TLO program is considered a model for other 
states, and ACTIC routinely hosts delegations interested in learning more about its 
operation.     
 
Conclusions 
When considered together, the multi-layered human and technological linkages 
constructed by the Phoenix Homeland Defense Bureau, its CERT program, and close 
relationships between HDB and Phoenix hospitals, the Maricopa County Department of 
Emergency Management, and the ACTIC and TLO program are a model program and 
best management practice that can easily be implemented in other states with minimal 
outlay.  From the low-cost Homeland Defense Bureau to the unique funding 
collaboration that created ACTIC, these various programs provide contrasting examples 
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of accomplishing the same end result in different ways.  These programs represent 
unique and innovative ways to improve communication and information management 
linkages in mass casualty response, not just in Arizona, but nationwide. 
These conclusions are also supported when evaluating Phoenix utilizing the 10-
point CIR audit/evaluation tool developed in Chapter III (see Table 4.1).  While there 
remain opportunities for improvement in a few areas, Phoenix represents the most 
comprehensive and multi-layered system of organizational management strategies, 
which have primacy in importance in improving CIR linkages, that was found during this 
research. 
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Table 4.1.  Phoenix Community CIR Linkage Scorecard. 
 
  Performance Indicator 
Phoenix 
Rating 
1. 
Institutional commitment by key response organizations demonstrated by dedication of 
staff to focused emergency planning and coordination among EMA and hospital 
communities. 
Exemplary 
2. Formalized committees or other interaction mechanisms between EMA staff and staff from all hospitals in community.  Exemplary 
3. 
Informal interaction opportunities: 
    - within EMA community 
    - between EMA and hospital community 
    - within hospital community 
 
Exemplary 
Exemplary 
Satisfactory 
4. Pre-event status of interpersonal relationships among all key stakeholders in EMAs and hospitals. Exemplary 
5. Development of community hazard vulnerability analysis and use by all key stakeholders in planning. Exemplary 
6. Development of redundant, interoperable communication methods connecting all key EMA and hospital stakeholders. 
EMA – Exemplary 
Hospitals – Needs Improvement
7. Development of large-scale information management and decision documentation mechanisms that are interconnected among all key EMA and hospital stakeholders. Exemplary 
8. Community-wide planning effort for hospital resource support during mass casualty event, including pre-event planning for competition for resources by hospitals. Satisfactory 
9. Capability of all hospitals in community to decontaminate mass volumes of patients for hazardous materials contamination. Satisfactory 
10. Routine community-wide drills or practice mechanisms for multi-hospital response to mass casualty events. Exemplary 
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    CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Summary of Research Contributions 
 This dissertation presents a condensed assessment of the major research and 
national policy initiatives that impact CIR linkages among hospitals and EMAs, and 
makes recommendations grounded in evidence-based research that can be used by any 
organization involved in emergency response to strengthen CIR linkages.  Through a 
review of previous literature and the conduct of a survey of EMAs and hospitals in 
several major U.S. cities, it was determined that CIR linkages have benefited from the 
resources directed at the problem since the events of September 11, 2001.  However, 
significant opportunities for improvement remain.  Strengths and weaknesses of current 
CIR linkages within the hospital community, within the EMA community, and between 
hospitals and EMAs are highlighted, and the potential for employing innovative 
organizational management strategies and decision-support tools to cost-effectively 
address the identified deficiencies are examined.   
 As the field of emergency preparedness has gained importance throughout the 
country since 9/11, affected organizations have been left void of actual research that 
explores what really works and what does not.  Disaster planning is only as good as the 
assumptions on which it is based, and most have relied on anecdotal evidence, myth or 
government mandate to move forward with improvements of CIR linkages.  As JCAHO 
discussed in 2003 and Auf der Heide reiterated in 2006, “there is a fundamental need for 
templates or scalable models of community-wide preparedness to guide planning.  
Several nascent templates are emerging; however, there are none yet that present 
evidence-based models which are likely to be adaptable to the varied urban, suburban, 
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and sparsely populated communities that make up the United States”. (JCAHO, 2003; 
Auf der Heide, 2006).   
This research has contributed a set of research-based recommendations for CIR 
linkage improvement, a combination of innovative organizational management strategy 
and enhanced decision-support capability   It has also contributed a documented best 
practice case study of CIR linkages in a major metropolitan area, that can be adapted to 
various community settings.  Moreover, a product of the research is a CIR 
evaluation/audit tool that can be used by any community to assess the quality of its CIR 
linkages.  Its use is also illustrated as part of the case study, serving as both a CIR 
baseline assessment and gap analysis. 
 
Opportunities for Future Research 
 As in any comprehensive research effort, there is always room for improving or 
extending study methods and objectives.  In this instance, opportunities for research in 
the disaster planning field are abundant and badly needed. 
 Based on the research conducted herein, one future research direction would be 
the expansion of the community study in terms of data and scope.  Expansion to 
additional cities would yield an improved robustness to the findings, based on a larger 
sample of hospitals and (most particularly) EMAs that have been queried.  Expansion 
would also allow for the potential identification and investigation of additional innovative 
strategies.  CIR linkages within the hospital community were found to be weaker than 
those among EMAs and hospitals; thus, additional research could focus on developing 
evidence-based improvement strategies specifically for the hospital community.   
 Data gathered during this research could be used to design and implement the 
conceptualized decision-support system.  This tool could be piloted in one of the cities 
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that reported that EMAs and hospitals were already using GIS for other applications to 
overcome hesitation by the hospital community in applying this technology. 
 A prime opportunity for future research would be to study the effectiveness of 
these improvement strategies in the same community prior to and after an actual mass 
casualty event, to determine whether these models actually improved response when 
compared against a control community that had not implemented any improvement 
strategies.  This research would be extremely challenging to conduct.  Alternatively, a 
retrospective study of a number of mass casualty events could yield extremely useful 
results and would be unique to this field of study.   
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